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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the effects of foreign direct investment on Kazakhstan’s political growth.
Kazakhstan’s transition to a market economy was plagued by corruption, and heavy investment in the
oil industry generated resource dependency concerns. The regime later began to exert control over the
oil industry through renegotiated contracts and legislative changes. This enriched and empowered the
regime. As a result, Kazakhstani president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, was able to consolidate control over
the state by employing “soft authoritarian” tactics and by rewarding political supporters. The regime
was able to employ these tactics because of the wealth that foreign investment created. Thus, control
over the investment-friendly oil industry allowed the regime to strengthen its hold over Kazakhstan,
limiting opportunities for meaningful political reform.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Kazakhstan achieved astonishing levels of growth following independence. In spite of poor
conditions that existed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the state would become Central Asia’s
“most stable” economy.1 Economic reforms created conditions helped draw foreign investment, which
encouraged growth. For example, privatization enabled to state to draw over USD 2 Billion in foreign
direct investment, FDI, by 2001. The majority of this investment was used to develop the state’s oil
reserves. This investment, in addition to higher oil prices, was the primary cause of the state’s economic
growth.2 This growth helped Kazakhstan prosper, yet resource revenues also affected political
development. The governing regime now actively participates in the oil industry. Political elites were
empowered during this process and have used this clout to consolidate their hold over political life.
Thus, oil revenues have contributed to autocratic behaviors among political leaders in Kazakhstan, which
has limited political development.
The regime earned revenues through participation in the oil industry and was able to use this
participation to expand its control over the state. Interaction with the oil sector allowed the regime to
control the state’s most lucrative industry and to manage foreign entry into the state.Such
developments strengthened the regime’s control over this vital industrial sector. Important steps in this
process were the creation of a national oil company, NOC, and regulatory reforms that enhanced state
oversight of the oil industry. Creation of a NOC allowed the regime to create a role for itself within the
oil industry, while modified laws and tax codes allowed the regime to extract revenues from

1

Levent Koch and M. Ali Chaudary, “Economic Transformation of Kazakhstan: Evidence from
Liberalization Reforms,” Journal of Academic Studies (2002): 145.
2
Richard Pomfret, “Kazakhstan’s Economy since Independence: Does the Oil Boom Offer a
Second Chance for Sustainable Development,” Europe-Asia Studies 57 (September 2005): 867; Koch and
Chaudary, 143.
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participating MNCs.3 This participation enabled the regime to enrich itself and strengthen its control
over the national oil industry. Such developments have also influenced political development in
Kazakhstan.
The regime was able to use increased revenues to expand its control over political life in
Kazakhstan. The regime had already displayed authoritarian instincts, yet resource wealth allowed
government officials to forego traditionally repressive tactics. Accordingly, scholars suggested that
governments that were able to attract FDI were able to strengthen their political position, although
investment only contributed to autocratic behavior in regimes that already displayed such leanings.4It is
also significant that the regime began to adopt means of persuasion and image-making to control the
public sphere instead of resorting to overt repression. Others speculated that increased revenues
enabled the regime to deploy more subtle tactics of control.5 Such findings indicate that prosperity
enabled the regime to find more effective means of maintaining control over political life in Kazakhstan.
The regime’s increased participation in the oil industry also contributed to corruption in
Kazakhstan. For example, observers noted that nearly USD 500,000 in “privatization bonuses from
foreign companies,” who were in negotiations to enter the state, had completely vanished. Likewise,
journalists have suggested that as much as twenty percent of the “country’s wealth is believed to have
ended up in Swiss bank accounts.”6Such accusations of embezzlement imply that Kazakhstan features a
non-transparent government. These tendencies were likely to have been exacerbated by oil revenues.

3

Rudiger Ahrend and William Tompson, “Caspian Oil in a Global Context,” Transitional Study
Review 14 (2007): 172: Political Risk Services, “Kazakhstan: Country Conditions, Investment Climate,”
Political Risk Services Group (May 2005), 3.
4
Oksan Bayulgen, “Foreign capital in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Curse or blessing,”
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005): 52.
5
Edward Schatz, “Transitional image making and Soft Authoritarian Kazakhstan,” Slavic Review
67 (Spring 2008): 50-52; Bayulgen, “Foreign capital in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” 50.
6
Wojciech Ostrowski, Politics and Oil in Kazakhstan (New York: Routledge, 2010), 86; Lutz
Kleveman, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 81.
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Scholars found that access to revenues often gave autocratic rulers incentive to retain their position.7
Kazakhstan is unlikely to achieve significant political development until these issues have been resolved.
Background
It must be noted that the regime’s ability to influence political development, as described
above, slowly developed after the state achieved independence. Pomfret observed that Kazakhstan was
mired in a recession, in which the national GDP declined by 40 percent between 1991 and 1995.Indeed,
the national economy did not begin to recover until 1999.8 The regime was willing to offer substantial
concessions in order to attract investment during this period. For example, during negotiations with
MNCs, the regime provided substantial contractual guarantees that it would later attempt to nullify,
claiming MNCs had defrauded Kazakhstan.9 While the state would later be able to establish control over
these corporations, the state was initially required to offer incentives to attract capital. The regime’s
ability to overcome these setbacks allowed the regime to justify its future consolidation. Understanding
the conditions that Kazakhstan faced following independence is crucial to explaining its subsequent
actions against this industry.
As previously noted, Kazakhstan faced a variety of challenges after it achieved independence.
Use and construction of pipelines that carried Kazakhstani oil illustrate the nature of these problems.
Examination of pipeline policies is indicative of the issues that plagued the regime. Kazakhstan does not
border an externally accessible body of water andexport arrangements were only viable if Kazakhstan
remained on good terms with its neighbors. Scholars thus observed that the regime encouraged
“regional integration” and accommodated the policies of critical foreign allies who were active in the

7

Oksan Bayulgen, “Facing the dilemma of capitalism: the case of Azerbaijan,” Central Asian
Survey 22 (June/September 2003), 216.
8
Pomfret, 860, 862.
9
Ahrend and Tompson, 170, 172; the state would later implement policies “it had previously
been too weak or inexperienced to uphold.”

4
region.10 Export arrangements reflected a similar spirit of cooperation. For instance, the Caspian Pipeline
Consortium’s pipeline, CPC, connects to the Tengiz field, crosses Russian territory and also connects
Chinese fields, providing multinational access to the state’s oil.11 The state’s need to accommodate
multiple interests in developing export lines demonstrated that Kazakhstan’s economic viability was
dependent on maintaining positive relationships with its neighbors.
Kazakhstan’s desire to maintain positive relationships with its neighbors was also designed to
help the state avoid dependence on Russia. The CPC pipeline was intended to reduce the state’s reliance
on the Russian-made Transneft pipeline that is owned by Transneft, itself owned by Russia. This
company engaged in “monopsonistic practices,” including inequitable “route allocations,” and random
pricing measures.12 Kazakhstan also utilizes the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, BTC, which crosses the Caucasus
to Turkey. American and some Kazakhstani officials favor this pipeline as it does not cross Russian
territory. Others favored a pipeline that crossed the Caspian into Iran. Kazakhstani officials viewed this
as fiscally and “economically sensible,” yet American political concerns prevent this from becoming a
viable alternative.13 These projects and the geopolitical interests they entail demonstrated that the
regime intended to develop positive relationships with the international community, while avoiding
dependence on Russia.14 Yet the constraints of developing relationships also highlighted the challenges
that Kazakhstan faced after achieving independence.
Foreign direct investment
Such conditions shaped Kazakhstan’s ability to export its oil. Yet the state required a
considerable amount of investment in order to access these resources. Kazakhstan was not guaranteed

10

Fiona Hill, “Whither Kazakhstan,” the National Interest (October 2005): 6; page numbers
correspond to a PDF printout.
11
Pomfret, 868.
12
Pomfret, 868, 867.
13
Lutz Kleveman, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia, (New York: Grove Press,
2003), 76, 90-92.
14
Hill, 6.
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such investment and made concessions in order to attract the necessary funding. These compromises
helped Kazakhstan, yet other factors also enabled the state to recruit investors. A review of the
conditions that draw investment can explain Kazakhstan’s success. Some, citing Dunning’s “International
production and the multinational enterprise,” observed that a multinational corporation, MNC, will
invest in a state based on advantages of entering that state. A corporation that encountered favorable
conditions would be more likely to invest. For example, an “ownership advantage” refers to a
production model or resource that allows an international corporation to operate more efficiently than
others in that state. Such advantages allow an MNCto capture benefits or capitalize on “firm-specific
motivations” that make investment advantageous.15
Li and Resnick made similar observations and extended Dunning’s hypotheses. They observed
that Dunning’s “location-specific” advantages helped developing states attract investment. Commodities
including raw materials, a large supply of labor, and appropriate economic policies helped states recruit
investors.16Natural resources or other contextual featuresalso enable a state to attract foreign
investment.Firms also invest abroad when doing so allows them to capture a greater share of a market.
Thus, the natural features of a state represent a major factor in drawing investment.
A state’s investment climate may also shape a corporation’s decision by mitigating foreign
concerns over domestic behavior. Firms encounter “political risks” created by the potential for host
regimes to appropriate corporate property. This led scholars to conclude that governments capable of
mitigating such risks draw investment by reducing “costs of internalizing production.”17 Li and Resnick
observed that a state which could guarantee “favorable regulation, preferential treatment…and sound
15

Nathan M. Jensen, “Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes
and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment,” International Organization 57 (Summer 2003): 591; favorable
conditions included an “ownership advantage,” “locational advantage,” and an “international
advantage.”
16
Quan Li and Adam Resnick, “Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct
Investment Inflows to Developing Countries,” International Resources 57 (Winter 2003): 179.
17
Jensen, 592.
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property rights protections” would be an ideal location for investment.18 Governments willing to offer
such assurances were more likely to attract foreign investment.
Effects of FDI on political development
The effect of FDI often varies according to the sector receiving investment. Scholars found that
changes in bargaining strength between a host-state and an MNC could be analyzed according to the
industrial sector receiving investment. They found that investment in extractive industries often led to a
shift in negotiating leveragein favor of host-states. After a multinational had financed infrastructural
development, host-states were able to gain project management capabilities within the industry,
allowing the state to maintain production without assistance from the MNC.19 These conditions would
suggest that investment in extractive industries can enable governments to develop the capacity to
operate autonomously within the sector. This would also imply that states with extractive industries can
develop the capacity to demand concessions from an MNC as a result of extractive sector development.
Others who examined the impact of investment suggested that financial growth may contribute
to corruption in states that featured traditional patronage systems. It was also observed that FDI may
lead to corruption when investment rapidly enters or exits a state.20 Ross noted that resource revenues
enabled a state to placate social groups through generous spending policies and reduced taxation, which
helped isolate a government from criticism.21 It is equally significant that discovery of oil in Chad
contributed to the deterioration of that state’s political climate, and that the state’s president utilized
authoritarian means to capture the states’ resource revenues.22 Such conditions indicate that

18

Li and Resnick, “Reversal of Fortunes,” 180.
Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The politics and growth of newly
industrializing countries (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 220-21.
20
Bryan W. Husted, “Wealth, Culture, and Corruption,” Journal of International Business Studies
30 (Second Quarter, 1999): 343; Robertson and Watson, 387-89.
21
Michael L. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy,” World Politics 53 (April 2001): 332-35.
22
Matthew S. Winters and John Gould, “Betting on Oil: The World Bank’s Attempt to Promote
Accountability in Chad,” Global Governance 17 (2011): 235-37, 239.
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investment, in addition to the revenues investment generates, may lead non-democratic governments
to exploit their position in order to pursue personal or political gains.
Conditions in Kazakhstan indicate that FDI had a negative impact on the state’s political climate.
Scholars who examined the Kazakhstani economy found state institutions to be non-transparent. Others
who examined the privatization process, in which the state’s “largest factories” were privatized through
“individually negotiated” agreements, found the process to be incredibly corrupt.23 It was also observed
that after the oil sector began to develop, political leaders utilized techniques of undermining opposition
figures without resorting to overtly oppressive measures.24 Such conditions confirm that the institutional
quality of the Kazakhstani government has declined. These developments can be attributed to FDI, and
may indicate that FDI, and the revenues it generated, had a negative impact on Kazakhstan.
Corporate interaction with a host regime
The relationship between investors and the host government is also a crucial factor in
promoting economic development. For example, security against nationalization is a primary concern
for investors.Bayulgen observed that, having invested in a state, corporations actively petition a regime
to address their concerns, especially those regarding consistent regulation and protection of property.
Indeed, demand for these conditions is such that investors may be unconcerned with the state’s broader
political climate.25Investors alsosought protection against tax code revision and similar forms of
regulation. Thus, for investors in Kazakhstan, the “crucial factor” was the regime’s willingness to make
these guarantees.26 The government’s ability to provide this type of legal protection represented a vital
component of the regime’s ability to attract investment.
Corporate interest in political development is generally limited. Gulbrandsen and Moe observed
that collaborative organizations in Kazakhstan, which featured investing corporations and members of
23

Olcott, 139.
Schatz, 50-52.
25
Bayulgen, “Foreign capital in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” 54.
26
Ahrend and Tompson, 170.
24
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the regime, were only willing to challenge the government when issues that threatened investmentrelated operations arose.27 International organizations sought to pressure oil corporations into playing a
larger role in promoting transparency in Kazakhstan, yet corporations have resisted such activities.
Indeed, Gulbrandsen and Moe found that corporations did not consider it to be their responsibility to
critique government use of resource revenues. This led the authors to categorize joint corporate efforts
as “the ‘law of the least ambitious,’” in which the most inactive organization shapes the scope of
government pressure.28 Such conditions suggest that concern over investments can limit corporate
willingness to call for reforms.
Gulbrandsen and Moe also observed that, while corporations may face international calls to
promote transparency, such efforts may be met with hostility by the host state, suggesting that contract
termination and other repercussions may reduce calls for transparency.29 Bayulgen observed that
investors may favor a degree of plurality, as it allows them to utilize the political process to petition the
state, yet such requests are likely to be confined areas affecting their investment.30 Corporate
inattention to broader political issues may have shaped the regime’s decision-making process, allowing
it to expand its control over the state.
Such actions can reinforce authoritarian tendencies. Bayulgen noted that authoritarian regimes
provided security that allowed select economic sectors to prosper, yet also contributed to authoritarian
persistence by enriching state leaders. For example, revenues provide autocrats with motivation to
retain their office, which provides further access to resource revenues.31 Baylugen also suggested the
ability to attract investment helped legitimize state leaders. Continued investment may imply approval
27

Lars H. Gulbrandsen and Arild Moe, “Oil Company CSR Collaboration in ‘New’ Petro-States,
Journal of Corporate Citizenship 20 (Winter 2005): 60.
28
Gulbrandsen and Moe, 55, 62.
29
Gulbrandsen and Moe, 60.
30
Bayulgen, “Foreign capital in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” 54.
31
Oksan Bayulgen, “Facing the dilemma of capitalism: the case of Azerbaijan,” Central Asian
Survey 22 (June/September 2003), 216.
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from the international community and can improve a leader’s public image.32 Such conditions suggest
that investment influenced political development in Kazakhstan by indicating foreign support for
President Nazarbayev and by creating incentive to retain political power.
Effects of oil revenues on political development
Scholars characterized a state whose natural resources attract high levels of revenue as a
“rentier state.” Such states accumulate revenue that is supplied by international investors. Revenue
under these conditions is created by a minority; most citizens are only involved in the consumption of
rents. Such wealth also allows governments to downplay calls for political reform. For example, greater
resources may allow a government to reduce taxes, which may also reduce demands for inclusion in the
political process.33 Revenues generated by natural resources may therefore enable a government to
placate and control the public. This type of influence may also limit calls for political reform.
The political context of Kazakhstan fits this description. OECD reports indicated that Kazakhstan
collected “the lowest general government revenue and expenditure as a share of GDP…on 2001
returns.” In addition, natural resources attracted nearly USD 30 Billion in 2004.34 This suggested that
Kazakhstan featured some of the characteristics of a rentier state. Such conditions also indicate political
decision makingwas influenced by resource revenues. Thus, the abundance of resource revenues may
have also influenced the regime’s political behavior, which effected political development.35
The regime was also able to extract rents through manipulation of its relationships with foreign
oil companies. This was achieved through legal modifications and enforcement of unrealistic laws.
Analysts found that MNCs found it necessary to guard their investments against perpetual legal and

32

Bayulgen, “Foreign capital in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” 52; quoting Armijo, “Financial
Globalization and Democracy in Emerging Markets,” 2001.
33
Ross, 329, 332.
34
Kaser, 466, 465; Political Risk Services, 1.
35
Ross, 330.
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regulatory reforms.36 The regime also passed legislation in 2003 that made contractual agreements
retroactively susceptible to revision, including additional requirements that forced onto corporations.
Additional changes included multinational agreements which effected the development of “goods
subject to excise duties.”37The ability of the regime to enforce these developments may have assisted
the regime’s efforts to develop control over the national oil industry.
The regime’s ability to develop control over the state’s most important economic sector
suggests that the regime had consolidated its hold over important political institutions. Collection of
resource revenues enabled the regime to establish this level of control. Ross observed that the link
between resource-generated revenues and political reform was negative, suggesting that governmental
control increased as resource revenues increased. Bayulgen also suggested that resource revenues had a
tendency to “make states less democratic.”38Thus, exploitation of Kazakhstan’s natural resources could
enable autocratic behavior among national leaders. Such effects are possible in any state with natural
resources, yet Pomfret observed that the impact of revenues on political development was often shaped
by institutional context: Oil revenues that enriched states without a democratic background contributed
to abuse of political power.39 Political conditions as Pomfret described exist in Kazakhstan. The state’s
ability to collect resource revenues helped empower Kazakhstan’s political elite.
Oil drove Kazakhstan’s economic development.40Yet these resources are also finite, and
depletion will have serious ramifications on the state’s economy. Continued dependency on oil reserves
will also magnify potential consequences. Pomfret observed the state was unsuccessful in its attempts
to diversify the national economy following independence. He claimed economic sectors unconnected
36

Political Risk Services, 4.
Ahrend and Tompson, 174; the authors observed that such changes were also designed to
prevent overdevelopment.
38
Ross, 328;Bayulgen, “Foreign capital in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” 67.
39
Pomfret, 872.
40
Pomfret, 860; “the oil and minerals sector” drove economic growth after the 2000 economic
“boom.”
37
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to the oil industry were unsuccessful in transitioning to an open economy.41 Failure to achieve diverse
economic growth will have a devastating effect on Kazakhstan after its resources are depleted.
Connection to theory and organization of research
This thesis expounds upon the complex relationship between foreign investment and political
development. Scholars who examined this connection noted investment shapes the “political fortunes”
of national leaders and, in Central Asia, contributed to autocratic consolidation through neglect of nongovernment industries and by creating incentive to maintain status-quo relationships.42 Others who
examined the impact of foreign investment on corruption have found that the pace with which
investment enters the country strongly contributes to an uptick in instances of corruption. As corruption
involves misuse of public means to advance a private or personal goal, it is considered to have a
negative impact on political development.43 This thesis contributes to these studies by highlighting the
mechanisms which allowed the Nazarbayev regime to consolidate power. It is significant that, while the
president had displayed authoritarian leanings, his control over state institutions increased after MNCs
began to invest in Kazakhstan.
This thesis also examines the impact of oil revenues on political development. The link between
resource wealth and political development has been well documented. Ross suggested that “oil inhibits
democracy even exports are fairly small, particularly in poor states.” This development is manifested
through a “rentier effect,” which allows oil-wealthy governments to avoid extensive taxation and to
reward political support, which reduces demand for political liability.44 Kazakhstan has been able to
extract these rents. Yet it should be noted that foreign investment may also have the same impact as oil
revenues, with regards to political development. Ross also noted that a “rentier state” collected

41

Pomfret, 869.
Bayulgen, “Foreign capital in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” 50.
43
C.J. Robertson and Andrew Watson, “Corruption and Change: The Impact of Foreign Direct
Investment,” Strategic Management Journal 25 (April 2004): 387-89, 386.
44
Ross, 356, 327-28.
42
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revenues paid by international contributors and are only captured by the minority of a population, the
majority participating in “distribution or utilization of” rents.45This description can also describe the
state’s ability to attract foreign investment. This thesis will demonstrate that foreign investment in
Kazakhstan has influenced political development in a manner similar to oil revenues.
The chapters of this thesis have been segmented in order to demonstrate how oil revenues
influenced political development in Kazakhstan. Chapter two addresses Kazakhstan’s economic
development following independence. The regime implemented structural reforms during this period
that helped attract FDI and played a major role in promoting growth. The regime’s ability to overcome
various socio-political challenges also provided a foundation for the state’s growth. Yet these reforms
only encouraged investment in the oil industry. Kazakhstan can thus be characterized as a resource
dependent state. The chapter will conclude with the observation that reforms primarily benefitted the
oil industry, and that this industry was primarily responsible for the state’s economic success.
Chapter three will examine the regime’s interaction with the oil industry. Kazakhstan
implemented several reforms and made initial concessions in order to attract investment. However, the
regime would later take steps to regain control over the sector through changes to legal and regulatory
provisions. The regime also created a national oil company to assist in this process, which was intended
to facilitate state participation in the oil industry.46This participation also influenced political life in
Kazakhstan by empowering national leaders and bureaucrats overseeing the oil industry and
encouraging corruption. The chapter demonstrates that oil revenues enabled the regime to reward
supporters while preventing the development of opposition groups. This enhanced the regime’s
autocratic tendencies.

45
46

Ross, 329.
Ahrend and Tompson, 172.
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Finally, chapter four will examine the regime’s ability to consolidate political power over the
state. Oil revenues facilitated autocratic tendencies that the regime had already begun to display.
Specifically, revenues enabled the regime to use non-repressive tactics to establish control over the
state. Scholars found that the regime had learned to cultivate public opinion against opposition
figures.47 Corruption among elites also limited opportunities for political development. Members of the
president’s family have been granted influential posts in important sectors of the national economy.48
This concentration of political power can be considered corruption and may have prevented opposition
groups from developing in business sectors. The chapter thus demonstrates that oil revenues allowed
the regime to control important facets of political life in Kazakhstan, further cementing its rule.
Such conditions indicate that oil revenues had a significant impact on political development.
Resource revenues led to modification of autocratic behaviors and contributed to corruption. Policies
designed to expand Kazakhstani control over the oil industry also enriched the regime and ensured that
its supporters occupied influential posts within the national economy.49 It is unlikely that, under these
conditions, any domestic opposition group will emerge to challenge the Nazarbayev regime.

47

Schatz, 50-52.
Andersen, 146; Ostrowski, 49.
49
Franke, et. al., 114-15.
48

14
Chapter 2: Economic Development in Kazakhstan
Introduction
Kazakhstan achieved a remarkable level of economic growth since gaining independence. Having
emerged under difficult conditions, the state’s development as a market economy is a considerable
achievement.50 The regime used this growth to assume control over development projects in the oil
industry. The regime achieved this control through legislative changes, such as a law that granted the
government rights to shares in development projects before the shares are marketed. This law helped
the regime undermine foreign investors.51 Although these changes empowered the government, such
behavior may discourage future investors from entering the state and could damage Kazakhstan’s long
term economic viability.
The state achieved a remarkable level of growth in spite of major problems following
independence. Indeed, Kazakhstan has been described as being more developed than other Soviet
republics. Much of Kazakhstan’s subsequent success can be explained by the state’s oil resources.
Scholars claim that oil and gas industries are responsible for almost “80 percent of [Kazakhstan’s]
industrial output.”52 Yet such resources did not guarantee a smooth transition from Soviet rule. The
state experienced major shortcomings after the collapse of the Soviet Union and these issues have
affected the pace of Kazakhstan’s economic growth.53
The state achieved this growth through a combination of legislative reforms, privatization, and
accompanying foreign direct investment, or FDI. For example, a 1995 law intended to develop the
banking industry gave the government oversight and allowed the state to move assets away from

50

Pradeep Agrawal, “Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction: Evidence from Kazakhstan,”
Asian Development Review 24 (2007): 91; Levent Koch and M. Ali Chaudary, “Economic Transformation
of Kazakhstan: Evidence from Liberalization Reforms,” Journal of Academic Studies (2002): 145.
51
Wojciech Ostrowski, Politics and Oil in Kazakhstan (New York: Routledge, 2010): 146-47.
52
Fiona Hill, “Whither Kazakhstan,” the National Interest (October 2005): 6, 8; page numbers
correspond to PDF printout.
53
Yerbol Orynbaev, “Kazakhstan’s Greater Competitiveness as a Prerequisite of Development
and a New Quality of Life,” American Foreign Policy Interests 28 (October 2006): 393.
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problematic areas.54 This reform was crucial to the development of a viable banking sector. Likewise,
privatizations attracted nearly USD 7 Billion in the mid-1990’s and helped the state modernize its
economy.55 These policy components were essential to Kazakhstan’s economic development.
Explanations of the state’s success must consider how these elements helped the regime create growth.
Kazakhstan’s natural resources were also essential to its economic growth. Interest in these
resources began before the Soviet Union collapsed: Chevron and others agreed to invest almost USD 20
Billion to develop these fields.56 New fields were also discovered after independence. The Kashgan field
is estimated to contain several billion barrels worth of oil and may eventually increase the state’s export
capacity.57 Kazakhstan’s development cannot be explained apart from these resources, and such assets
fueled the state’s economic growth.
This development was not without consequences. The government has begun to enact tougher
polices that limit corporate earnings. For instance, the regime passed legislation that granted it the right
to purchase shares in a project before it is marketed for sale.58 Domestic participation in resource
development is not inherently troubling; however, this behavior is problematic because control of these
industries was granted to privileged citizens with ties to the regime.59 This raised concerns of about
corruption. Government treatment of foreign investors was also uneven. Scholars observed the
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Alexandr Akimov and Brian Dollery, “Financial System Reform in Kazakhstan from 1993 to
2006 and its Socioeconomic Effects,” Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 44 (May-June 2008): 83.
55
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Boom Offer a Second Chance for Sustainable Development,” Europe-Asia Studies 57 (September 2005):
864.
56
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government had inconsistently applied tax laws and was “blatantly unfair” to foreign corporations in
other instances.60 Such conditions could easily prevent future investors from entering Kazakhstan.
Such “government intervention” may further damage the state’s ability to attract investment.61
Other factors may also hamper economic growth: the state is in danger of becoming resource
dependent. Scholars have speculated that the state may be vulnerable to Dutch disease, which could
limit growth in other economic sectors.62 Thus, the growth that Kazakhstan achieved is not a guarantor
of stability. The state has reached impressive levels of development, but deliberate alteration of
investment conditions and resource dependency may undermine these achievements.
Independence and initial setbacks
The collapse of the USSR imposed several challenges on Kazakhstan and contributed to the
state’s initial economic difficulties. As with most Soviet republics, the Kazakhstani economy became
stagnant during the 1980’s and shrank in the 1990’s.63 Kazakhstan was also a component of the larger
Soviet economy and some sectors produced a small number of value-added products, while others
manufactured goods “in excess of local needs.” Other scholars observed that Soviet collapse damaged
Kazakhstan’s trade patterns, which “had accounted for more than 90 percent of the country’s trading
volume.”64 This crippled the national economy. Such conditions forced Kazakhstani leaders to reorganize
the national economy while simultaneously undergoing political transitions. Such challenges posed
serious challenges to economic growth.
Kazakhstan was poorly equipped to exploit its resources. The national economy had been based
on agriculture rather than natural resources. Indeed, agriculture accounted for 42 percent of
Kazakhstan’s economy while other sectors, including extractive industries only accounted for 21 percent
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of the national economy.65 Moreover, Soviet integration required Kazakhstani oil refineries to process
Siberian crude, while refineries in Russia processed Kazakhstani oil.66 Thus, the collapse of the USSR had
diminished Kazakhstan’s ability to process its own resources. Overcoming the setbacks caused by Soviet
integration was a significant accomplishment for the Kazakhstani government.
The collapse of the Soviet Union also carried major social ramifications. Crime and corruption
were rampant during this period, yet the most pressing issue was the flight of non-ethnic citizens.67
Russian minorities in Kazakhstan became a politically sensitive issue for the regime. Russian citizens
were among the “educated and technologically skilled [members of the] population.” Their status was a
point of contention between the state and Russia. The regime could not neglect these citizens, yet the
president also needed the support of ethnic Kazakhs in order to bolster his political authority. This
situation was partially resolved by Russian emigration and through easily converted citizenship between
Kazakhstan and Russia. Yet this also resulted in a loss of skilled workers among national elite.68 The
collapse of this human infrastructure also presented an early challenge to the state.
Investment in Kazakhstan was not guaranteed. The state lacked infrastructure that other former
Soviet republics possessed. Production deficiencies were also exposed as the state began to encourage
investment, and Kazakhstani industries required a significantly larger financial commitment in order
maintain operations. Scholars writing at the outset of this process observed that “the quality of finished
products was poor…” and that machinery in Kazakhstani factories was rarely functional. These
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shortcomings also led government officials to compromise over the terms of investment agreements.69
Indeed, Olcott claimed the state of Kazakhstani infrastructure was so dilapidated that government
officials were unaware of “how technologically obsolete” national industries were.70 Kazakhstan’s ability
to achieve economic growth becomes increasingly impressive in light of these structural deficits.
Market Reforms
Kazakhstan eventually matured into an economically viable state. This development was
partially created by successful legislative changes. These efforts oriented the national economy towards
global markets and helped the government manage the transition to a market economy. These reforms
also created the conditions that encouraged foreign investment. Yet such growth also improved the lives
of Kazakhstani citizens. According to scholars, the effectiveness of legislative reforms was evident in “the
fact that the ratio of financial assets…held by the public to GDP has increased.”71 A review of these
legislative changes helps illuminate the mechanisms of Kazakhstan’s growth.
Financial sector reforms were a major component of Kazakhstani success. A 1995 program
included initiatives that applied greater oversight to national banks and allowed the government to
foreclose on “non-viable banks.” The law also permitted the regime to move “non-performing loans”
away from problematic banks. Reforms included regulations against lending practices, insider trading,
and “reserve requirements,” among other efforts.72 Such reforms were important because they created
a financial sector that met international standards. Scholars claim that such reforms were a crucial step
in developing “a well-functioning banking system.”73 Such reforms were also an important step in
cultivating an image of Kazakhstan as having a stable investment climate.
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Liberalization continued throughout 1995 and the government eliminated “export quotas and
licensing requirement[s].” The state also introduced anti-trust measures and a modified tax code in the
same year. The regime then passed a “Deepening of Reforms” program in 1996 that addressed “macroeconomic stabilization, structural-institutional transformations,” and sought to cultivate crucial
economic areas.74 These reforms were important factors in liberalizing the economy. Drafting a new
constitution was also an important step in this process. Scholars claim the new constitution served as a
legal foundation for the reforms that created open markets. The document helped initiate the
privatization process and theoretically created “property owners and [laid] the foundation for the
middle class.” Thus, the new constitution represented an effort to institutionalize market reforms and
provide a foundation for future growth.75 These reforms helped the state attract foreign investment and
spurred the transition of the national economy.
The Privatization Process
Privatization was essential to Kazakhstan’s economic growth. Allowing national assets to be
developed by foreign investors generated revenue for the government and helped the state capitalize
on its resources. The state’s ability to attract investors was especially impressive when one considers the
lack of organization that initially plagued the state. Analysis of this process also explains how the state
achieved economic growth.
Privatization occurred in three stages, primarily between 1991 and 1998, although some
companies were sold in 1999.76 The first phase of this process was home privatization. The process was
carried out using a voucher system. Pomfret claimed that citizens received enough shares to purchase
their own homes. However, non-Kazakh minorities unevenly benefitted from this process. Russians and
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Uzbeks possessed nicer apartments in the capital because they also held higher paying employment,
and therefore received a “better housing allocation.”77
The second stage of privatization involved moderately sized factories and industries employing
more than 200 workers.78 This stage was also based on a voucher format and allowed citizens to
purchase shares of enterprises. Kazakhstanis received vouchers which could be used to buy into an
Investment Privatization Fund, or an IPF. This system was designed to prevent “excessive fragmentation
of ownership.” Yet voucher distribution skewed towards non-urban citizens and tended to favor ethnic
Kazakhs. Pomfret claimed the regime intentionally distributed vouchers in this fashion to remedy
inequalities that emerged during the first stage. This stage also marked the beginning of efforts to sell
portions of state industries to foreign companies. In 1993, the government sold shares of factories
producing tobacco, margarine, and other confectionary goods. This generated almost USD 450 million in
revenue for the government.79 However, investment fund managers unevenly benefitted from this
system and became “Kazakhstan’s new economic elite.” This made most citizens skeptical about the
privatization process.80 Citizens also became skeptical about the privatization process, as the wealthy
began to accrue greater resources. Partial privatization later slowed down, and by 1998 was replaced by
the sale of entire corporations.81
The third stage marked the acceleration of the privatization process. Olcott observed that
industries “were sold in part or whole” to foreign investors.82 Peck found the speed of the privatization
process remarkable and claimed the sale of state industries was accomplished in an astonishingly small
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window.83 As part of this stage, the government sold operational agreements to foreign investors who
were expected to improve production facilities and “market the enterprise’s assets without fully
assuming its debt.” The investor was then offered the chance to purchase stock in the plant. Most
factories maintained non-productive areas, including child care centers, living complexes and
infirmaries. It was assumed plants would generate profits once stripped of these obligations. These
agreements enabled the government to modernize industries, and it was hoped these renovated
facilities would enable the state to entice further investment.84
However, this stage of the process was stained by corruption. Peck expressed concern over the
lack of transparency associated with this stage of privatization.85 Olcott also expressed reservations over
this stage of privatization, characterizing this period of the privatization process as “the most corrupt
stage of investment.”86 Dealings between investors and the government were closed and details of
transactions were not publicized. This led Peck to conclude “bribery and other forms of payment were
the norm” during these negotiations.87 Such rumors suggest the privatization process was not entirely
transparent and provided a troubling insight into the regime’s behavior.
Several contracts were granted to mineral exploitation and processing companies during
privatization. Corporations purchased iron ore mines, aluminum, and chromite processing plants. Trans
World Group and the Kazakhstan Mineral Resources Corporation, or KMRC, purchased shares in these
resource mines and plants, as well as in Bauxite and Coal mines. Oversight conflicts with KMRC later
forced Trans World Group to withdraw from the state. These industries were then controlled by KMRC.
It was significant the corporation is owned by a bank manager who had business connections to
President Nazarbayev. Olcott also suggested Trans World Group fell out of favor with the regime before
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it pulled out of Kazakhstan. This led her to claim that maintaining positive relations with the government
was crucial to corporate entry into Kazakhstan.88 It would also appear that associates of the regime were
enriched through their connections, and were rewarded with lucrative opportunities. Such conditions
confirm charges of a corrupt during the privatization process.
Interestingly, the privatization process did not meet the government’s expectations.
Privatization drew nearly USD 7 Billion from late 1995 to late 1996, but many enterprises that were
marketed were not purchased. Moreover firms sold between 1996 and 1999 became less productive
than industries under state control.89 Olcott attributed this problem to these industries being
overvalued by the government. Indeed, “less than 5 percent of…large scale industries” had been sold by
1998, although a majority of smaller industries had been privatized by the fall of that year.90 Such figures
suggest the privatization process attracted investment, but fell short of the government’s intentions.
Foreign Direct Investment
Attracting the business of international investors was crucial to the development of the
Kazakhstani economy. This was a major objective of the state’s privatization process. Olcott claimed
“foreign investment goes hand in hand with privatization.”91 Kazakhstan’s privatization process can be
considered successful because it captured this investment. Between 1995 and 1997, foreign investment
in Kazakhstan grew by 37 percent. By 2003, FDI accounted for almost 12 percent of the national
economy.92 FDI clearly played a role in Kazakhstan’s growth. The regime’s ability to attract this
investment is a crucial explanation of the state’s economic success.
Attracting investment forced the state to meet conditions for corporate entry. Corporations
were concerned with the size of the national labor market, “physical infrastructure, supplier base,
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technology support,” and other contextual details within a state. Scholars observed that investment is
most likely in states that are politically stable, and with an independent legal system.93 Thus,
corporations invest in locations that provide a suitable climate for the development of their investment.
States hoping to attract investment must be able to meet these conditions.
Kazakhstan enacted legislative reforms as a way to encourage FDI and was successful in this
endeavor. Earlier reforms had allowed the state to attract investment at an accelerated rate. Data from
the Kazakhstan National Bank indicated the state garnered as much investment in the first six months of
2001 as it had throughout 2000.94 Between 1991 and 2006, rising levels of investment increased the
GDP per capita PPP by 166 percent. Unemployment across the country had also declined by 2007.95 Such
improvement suggests that reforms successfully drew investment. Kazakhstan attracted USD 30 billion
in foreign investment in 2005, two-thirds of which was invested by the US.96 “Investment in main
production assets” also topped USD 16 Billion in 2005, and was a substantial increase over 2004
investment levels.97 Such investment significantly enhanced Kazakhstan’s economy.
The state’s non-oil mineral resources also drew investment. The government offered incentives
to corporations that invested in such “priority economic sectors.”98 During this process, the previously
mentioned Trans World Metals group purchased shares in a chromium mine as well as the
accompanying processing plant. The firm also purchased shares in an “aluminum smelter in Pavlodar
and a ferro-alloy smelter in Aksu.”99 The British firm, ISPAT international purchased “Kazakhstan’s only
integrated steel mill.” Samsung assumed management of a national copper plant and later bought a
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substantial stake in the same plant.100 Kazakhstan’s mineral resources outside of the oil sector drew
investment in their own right.
Other sectors of the national economy attracted investment. In 1993, US tobacco company
Philip Morris began investment in Kazakhstan, worth USD 350 Million over five years. The company also
produced domestically sold cigarettes, and by 2000 the company had constructed a USD 200 million
plant in Southern Kazakhstan. American electrical corporations also invested in Kazakhstan. Between
1996 and 1997, AES purchased several power generating plants in Eastern Kazakhstan. The state also
awarded the corporation with “management control of regional electric distribution companies” for the
next decade and a half.101 Kazakhstan’s gold deposits also generated investment, although these
resources did not produce significant yields and created tensions between investing corporations and
the state.102 Thus, Kazakhstan’s was able to encourage investment in sectors outside of the oil industry.
Yet many have expressed concern regarding negative ramifications of foreign investment. For
example, scholars fear that Kazakhstan has become resource dependent. Pomfret noted that the state’s
agricultural sector was not profitable throughout the 1990’s. He also noted that by 2003, the regime was
not able to decide “how the farm sector should be organized” in a free market economy. Likewise,
“services sectors” saw their percentage of the national GDP decline “between 1998 and 2002,” and
observed that “coalmining and metallurgy” also experienced a downturn prior to 1998. Thus, sectors of
Kazakhstan’s economy declined while the national oil industry continued to develop. Pomfret attributed
many of these problems to institutional deficiencies and noted that these problems, in addition to an
inefficient “restructuring of existing enterprises,” limited opportunities for growth.103Such descriptions
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indicate that Kazakhstan’s non-oil economy failed to match the oil sector’s growth. These conditions
expose the state to problems of resource dependency.
The investment process also resulted in ownership consolidation. As foreign investors failed to
meet the terms of their contract, the regime sold rights to favored investors. As a result, the state’s
“minerals sector” is largely dominated by four corporations. For example, Samsung initially controlled a
single copper processing plant, yet would later be permitted to purchase failed enterprises across the
copper industry.104 Business deals were also dependent on political patronage. The dealings of Trans
World Group became increasingly difficult once a supportive Prime Minister was dismissed from office.
The company that assumed management of Trans World’s contracts also had connections to President
Nazarbayev.105 This type of business climate can undermine the state’s investor-friendly image and raise
concerns about corruption. Such conditions may discourage investors from entering the state and has
the potential to threaten Kazakhstan’s economic growth.
Scholars have expressed concern that the regime may damage its reputation as a positive
investment climate, with regards to protections guaranteed by Kazakhstan’s legal code. Legislative
changes exposed investors to increased taxation. For example, the regime originally passed legislation
designed to protect investors from government appropriation of corporate property.106 Yet others noted
current legal codes did not guarantee security against future modifications. Some corporations also
faced changes that incorporated current development projects into new tax regimes. This led analysts to
characterize development negotiations as non-transparent, noting that investors faced corruption at
multiple points within the government.107 Such problems have the potential to prevent future
investment in Kazakhstan. Investors may avoid the state if it continues to modify its legal codes.
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Oil Industry Development
Other sectors contributed to Kazakhstan’s growth, yet Kazakhstan’s oil resources were the
indispensable element in this process.Even President Nazarbayev observed “the oil sector’s
development became the locomotive of [Kazakhstan’s] economic growth.” Scholars also claimed that
the national economy was defined by resource exploitation.108 Others observed that Kazakhstan’s
development was attributable to a rise in the cost of oil, beginning in 1999.109 Thus, Kazakhstan’s
economic success is primarily attributable to its sizable oil reserves and the investment they drew.
Foreign direct investment was also crucial to the oil industry’s development, and the regime’s
efforts to attract this funding were equally important. A major step in this process was a 1994 law that
established “legal and economic principles” that governed investment and included measures
addressing asset securities and conflict resolution. Scholars viewed this as a signal of Kazakhstan’s
intention to create a stable investment climate. The law was designed to shield investment from state
intercession, including “expropriation, changes in legislation,” and other interventionist policies.110 It
should be noted that such concessions were granted because of the state’s pressing need of investment,
specifically to repair outdated infrastructure. Yet these policies were successful. As of 2005, nearly 60
percent of the annual FDI that entered Kazakhstan was invested in extractive industrial sectors.111
Negotiations for Kazakhstani oil began before the state achieved independence. Olcott observed
that Chevron began negotiating a deal to expand production at the “Tengiz oil field in 1990…”The Tengiz
field was estimated to contain between six and nine billion barrels of extractable oil, and at the time was
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Kazakhstan’s most productive oil field.112 Chevron later partnered with the Kazakhstani government and
other corporations to create TengizChevrOil and signed a forty year agreement to invest roughly USD 20
Billion into these fields. The conglomeration also procured a stake in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, or
CPC, a major pipeline that transports this oil to the Black Sea.113 The size of such resources helped draw
investors and drove economic development.
Tengiz was not the only major oil field in Kazakhstan’s portion of the Caspian Sea. The Kashgan
field was also estimated to hold nearly “30 billion barrels” of oil and proved significant enough to
provoke estimates of export levels comparable to Saudi Arabia. Yet negotiations over this field proved
contentious. Questions regarding the destination of this oil prevented American corporations from
developing the field, as the oil might have been shipped to Iran. Development only commenced when
the Italian company Agip was chosen to oversee development.114 Yet field prospecting at Kashgan also
generated revenue. According to LeVine, the mayor of the port nearest to the Kashgan field was able to
extract millions from oil MNCs to improve local infrastructure.115 Thus, interest in Kazakhstani oil
generated investment by itself, although geopolitical concerns presented challenges that hampered the
speed of field development.
Investment was not limited to Western corporations. The government sold the Chinese
government rights to the Uzen oil fields in 1997, which was the state’s second largest field at the time.
In return, Beijing promised to finance a pipeline to the Chinese border which would cost almost USD 10
billion over eight years. The Chinese also agreed to construct a pipeline to Iran. As of 2005, the pipeline
to the border was under construction and the Chinese national oil company, or CNPC, purchased the
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remainder of the shares in the Uzen field conglomeration.116 Yet as of 1999, Beijing only deployed
“about 60 percent of the planned investment…” This prompted Olcott to speculate the Chinese wanted
access to Kazakhstani resources, but did not consider cultivation of these fields a major necessity.117 Yet
China may become an important market for Kazakhstani oil, and relations between these states may
expand.
Not every corporation that invested in Kazakhstan was successful. In 1996, Hurricane
Hydrocarbons, or HHL, purchased fields that had previously been owned by the state. Yet by 1998 HHL
was involved in a dispute with its main refinery at Shymkent, which was owned by the Kazakh Central
Asian Industrial Investments group.118 By 1999, the firm faced commercial failure; in part because HHL
had not anticipated the extent of “community obligations” it had accepted. Such conditions required
HHL to approve a Kazakhstani bank as an investment partner.119 This suggested that investors still faced
a variety of challenges following entry into the country, including pressure to include local firms in
development projects.
The shortcomings of Hurricane Hydrocarbons illustrated several problems that characterized
investment conditions in Kazakhstan. As previously noted, most factories in the state maintained
nonproducing facilities, including “hospitals and apartment buildings” for employees. The fields HHL
purchased included such assets. When HHL attempted to reorganize these areas into integrated
decision-making processes, disenfranchised plant directors exploited connections with local police and
government officials to force to HHL to subcontract jobs to local companies.120 This illustrated that
investing corporations faced numerous structural problems in Kazakhstan that had the capacity to derail
investment.
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Corruption and resource dependency
These developments did not impede economic growth in Kazakhstan. Olcott observed that the
state possessed an estimated “16.4 billion barrels of oil reserves,” making investment in Kazakhstan a
virtual certainty.121 Yet the effects of the regime’s political agenda may damage long-term prospects for
growth. Prominent politicians have been accused of corruption and improper actions. For example,
President Nazarbayev acknowledged holding USD one billion in an undisclosed Swiss bank in 2002. The
president claimed these actions were intended to protect the national economy from the negative
effects of the hurried infusion of this capital.122 Such issues will be addressed further in later chapters.
Yet such actions are likely to undermine the credibility of the Kazakhstani government and may limit the
state’s ability to attract further investment.
The government’s tendency to enact legislation that effects foreign corporations may have
ramifications on future investment. The laws that the regime enacted gave the regime the ability to take
corporate assets, and may limit investment. Peck observed that, as of 2002, the national government
was drafting legislation which would facilitate seizure of corporate assets. Peck also noted that the
regime stopped courting potential investors, instead preferring to redistribute national properties to
“those close to the ruling elites.”123 These circumstances created a business climate in which investors
cannot guarantee the security of their investment. Such conditions have the potential to damage the
state’s reputation and may damage Kazakhstan’s ability to cultivate future investment.
The regime also began to legislate a greater role for itself in the oil industry. The regime has
passed regulations which gave the state the right to procure shares in resource development plans
before they could be marketed for sale. Experts also observed that corporations are unlikely to enter a
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state in which leaders can alter laws with “astonishing ease.”124 The regime’s ability to inject itself as a
developmental corporation into the oil industry is likely to damage the state’s reputation abroad, and
may damage the state’s ability to attract further investment and maintain economic growth.
Indeed, scholars believe such behavior will ultimately impede the country’s economic growth.
Peck speculated that economic development in Kazakhstan has faltered because of the influence of local
financial groups. Others also observed that the state’s ability to draw investment became increasingly
subverted due to trends of state intrusion into foreign projects.125 The oil industry was responsible for
the state’s economic development, yet the government’s tendency to interfere with foreign
corporations may threaten the state’s ability to exploit these resources.
The importance of oil cannot be overstated. The resource was almost entirely responsible for
the growth that Kazakhstan achieved. Yet such dependency may ultimately have negative effects. One
of such effect is Dutch disease, or an increase in the value of a national currency due to a single
resource, which also decreases state capacity to develop other tradable projects. Such conditions limit
development of a diverse economic infrastructure, leading to a decline when resources are depleted.
Kazakhstan was unable to capitalize on its resources and experienced a severe economic downturn
following independence.126 The state must avoid a return to such conditions by mitigating the possibility
of resource dependency.
Yet Kazakhstan may already be exposed to the effects of Dutch Disease. Scholars described the
national economy as being “characterized by an extractive orientation,” while the mining industry was
responsible for almost 54 percent of Kazakhstan’s industrial output in 2007.127 Others shared this
concern. Observers noted a reliance on natural resources represented a major challenge to the national
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economy, which could threaten continued development. Indeed, apart from its mineral resources, the
state was “a net importer of consumable goods.”128 Any number of issues could prevent the state from
successfully marketing its resources. The regime does not appear to have made a serious effort to
diversify its economy and to prevent this scenario from developing.129 Such conditions may not
inherently lead to economic collapse, yet this form of dependency certainly raises concerns over the
effects of resource depletion in Kazakhstan.
The state’s growth may also be threatened by changes in the international price of oil. Pomfret
claimed that pricing of natural resources was somewhat unpredictable, raising concerns over the impact
of declining international demand and poor returns on domestic investments.130 It should be noted that
Kazakhstan has benefitted from higher prices. Indeed, the state economy began to take off in 2007 and
2008 due to higher levels of extraction and the rising cost of oil.131 Thus, the national economy
benefitted from increased international demand; however, these prices may fluctuate and make it
difficult for Kazakhstan to maintain its current rate of growth. The state still maintains “the most stable
economy in Central Asia due to proper management.”132 Yet the conditions which created this
prosperity were neither permanent nor irreversible. The regime’s ability to effectively manage the
revenues generated by oil may jeopardize the state’s economic success.
Conclusion
The level of economic development Kazakhstan achieved is impressive. The state’s evolution
from a single economic component of the Soviet Union into Central Asia’s best established economy is
remarkable.133 The reforms that the Nazarbayev regime enacted helped make this growth possible by
encouraging foreign investment in Kazakhstan’s natural resources. These reforms were successful; the
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state was able to attract nearly USD 30 Billion in foreign investment in 2005.134 This level of investment
demonstrated the regime had successfully created a business climate that was capable of attracting FDI
from the international community. Such legislative changes helped Kazakhstan achieve growth following
independence and represented an important component of the state’s development.
However, Kazakhstan’s economic growth was primarily driven by natural resources. Scholars
observed that serious economic growth only occurred after development projects became active and
international prices rose.135 Pomfret claimed that resolutions to transport disputes and the discovery of
new fields were expected to guarantee the stable production rates well into the 21st Century. Such
benefits were also enhanced by a fivefold increase in the cost of oil over a six year period. Indeed, the
IMF anticipated that Kazakhstan’s natural resources would generate nearly USD 165 billion in revenues
by 2050.136 The state’s ability to exploit these conditions was connected to the reforms passed following
independence, yet revenues generated by the state’s oil reserves was the primary factor in Kazakhstan’s
economic development.
However, mismanagement of resource revenues may threaten these accomplishments. As
Pomfret previously observed, the state appears to be overly reliant on natural resources.137 Moreover,
the regime’s pattern of incursion into the oil industry may also damage the positive investment climate
that Kazakhstan cultivated.138 The regime has also displayed a willingness to rewrite laws and to
establish parameters for state entry into the oil sector. Such patterns are unlikely to encourage further
investment, and may have serious repercussions on Kazakhstan’s economic future.139 The level of
growth that the state achieved is still remarkable, yet these conditions are tenuous. The Nazarbayev
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regime must take both political and economic steps to maintain the investment climate that was
developed after the state gained independence. The state must also make efforts to diversify the
national economy, or risk economic collapse when resources are depleted.

34
Chapter III: Regime Expansion into the Oil Industry
Introduction
Multinational corporations sought to invest in Kazakhstan for a variety of reasons. Yet this
interest carried political ramifications. The capital that foreign corporations pumped into the state
strengthened the autocratic tendencies of President Nazarbayev’s administration. The regime was able
to leverage this newfound clout to asset its control over Kazakhstan’s oil industry. The regime achieved
this through steps that forced foreign oil companies to include domestic corporations and through
modification of oil contracts. Foreign investment itself also aided the regime’s efforts to control the oil
sector. Enrichment empowered the regime and enabled it to expand its control over other elements of
political life, leading to a reduction of political freedoms in Kazakhstan.
The Nazarbayev regime was initially obligated to make concessions to attract investment
following independence.140 Peter Riches considered this a common trend among states attempting to
attract investment. When signing a production sharing agreement, a government may postpone
collection of its dividend for a length of time, encouraging oil corporations to finance early development
expenses and allowing the corporation to capture early returns from the venture.141 Conditions
surrounding Kazakhstan’s independence prompted the regime to offer such incentives. However,
Kazakhstan also required a significant level of economic aid following independence. According to
Ahrend and Tompson, this contributed to a “weak bargaining position” that forced the regime to offer
additional concessions that it would have not been made in better conditions. Yet once the state’s oil
resources were developed, the regime began to insist upon a larger role in the oil industry.142 Conditions
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that Kazakhstan faced initially constrained the options available to the regime, yet it became
increasingly active as the oil sector matured.
Attempts by the regime to participate in the national oil industry may also be part of a natural
evolution between an investing corporation and a host government. This relationship alters as resources
develop. Riches found that, having invested in a state, an oil firm could expect to lose negotiating
leverage over the state as the investment developed.143 Evidence of such change is observable in
Kazakhstan. The state has adopted a more assertive stance against oil companies. For example, disputes
over taxation levels between investing corporations and the regime also centered on the understanding
of agreements that had previously been negotiated.144 Such events suggest that Riche’s analysis of
declining leverage over an investment period is accurate. These developments help explain how the
regime was capable of creating a greater role for itself in the national oil industry.
Conditions surrounding Kazakhstan’s independence also indicate that foreign multinationals
initially held negotiating leverage over the state.145 Given the regime’s expansion into the oil sector,
these changes imply that the relationship between investors and the state has changed over to the
length of the agreement. Riches defined this as an “obsolescing bargains” trend, in which state leaders
are likely to readdress earlier concessions regarding extraction of a state’s natural resources. A
government may develop the capacity to use its expanded leverage to renegotiate agreements.146 This
also suggests that the effects of foreign investment may allow political leaders to reverse earlier
decisions. It is therefore necessary to consider various effects of foreign investment on the political
development of a state.
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Foreign Investment and Political Development
Li suggested that investment in a democracy would lead to resistance to “incentive policies”
among political opposition figures, which may lead a state to limit corporate tax breaks. Such interaction
implies that FDI can influence political decision-making. If such effects occur in democratic states, it is
likely that autocratic regimes are also influenced by FDI. Li observed that politicians courting foreign
investors may provide financial breaks to foreign corporations as a way to gain personal corporate
sponsorship, rather than courting investment “for the sake of maximizing social welfare.” Li also feared
that providing tax incentives to corporations would trigger a “race to the bottom,” by reducing a state’s
fiscal assets and ultimately damaging the state over an extended period of time.147 Thus, attempts to
attract investment in non-democratic states may enable officials to rank personal motivations over state
objectives. Such action is likely to have a negative effect on political development within a state, and
would hamper political development.
Yet scholars disagree over the exact impact of FDI on development. Some scholars expressed
concern that investment may contribute to authoritarian behaviors among national leaders. Haggard
noted that the bargaining strength of investing corporations often depended on the sector receiving
investment. He suggested that relations between the corporation and a state would progress based on
the type of investment a state received. Likewise, Ross observed that revenues generated by natural
resources could have a negative impact on transparency and democratic development.148 This may, as
implied above, indicate that certain types of investment carry the same consequences as improperly
used oil revenues, suggesting that improper forms of investment may also contribute to autocratic
tendencies. Therefore, the effects of investment must be examined in order to illustrate the link
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between political development and investment. Within this framework, natural resource investment
must also be reviewed to determine how such revenues can affect government behavior.
Wibbels observed that integration into the global economy influenced the social spending
patterns of developing states. He hypothesized that integration led to lower levels of social welfare
spending by governments, as integration into the global economy would lead actors in “tradable
sectors” to oppose proactive government spending during recessions. Natural resource reliance, in
addition to “real exchange rate volatility,” would force developing states to reorganize social welfare
programs to avoid deficits. Wibbels believed such policies would severely impact impoverished citizens
in developing states. He concluded that policy decisions in developing states were heavily influenced by
“internationally inspired economic circumstances.”149 These conditions indicate that decision-making in
the developing world is shaped by external factors. Such conditions also influence the ability of a state
to attract investment, and may reorganize political priorities in a way that places investment attraction
over social aid for citizens. Such decision-making in a non-democratic state may have the potential to
empower leaders without providing citizens a forum to express discontent.
Yet implications as described above may differ between the sectors attracting investment. As
previously observed, the effect of investment may depend on the industry being developed. Haggard
suggested the effect of FDI on regime assertiveness during negotiations would vary across economic
sectors. According to Haggard, extractive corporations generally held a stronger negotiating position
than state governments prior to investment. Such industries required a considerable amount of capital
be implemented over an extended time table. This initially gave these MNCs leverage. Yet “once
investment was sunk,” states developed expertise that allowed them to take stronger negotiating
positions against the MNCs. However, “import substituting industries” gave the state the ability to
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restrict access prior to investment. These sectors lacked a supportive consumer base and potentially
faced domestic competition, leading Haggard to conclude that “the point of entry” represented the
weak negotiating point for these corporations.150 Thus, the impact of investment on the pace of political
development may vary according to economic sector. Extractive industries initially hold most
negotiating leverage, suggesting that governments must maintain positive relationships with these
MNCs during early investment stages. Yet successive regimes would be able to unilaterally revise these
relationships, in favor of the state.
Tugwell observed aspects of this relationship in Venezuela. He observed that political leaders
often lacked information about multinational interests, and that corporate decisions often affected
domestic welfare, which was also by determined “externally based [decision-makers.]” He suggested
these conditions would lead states to call for a larger role in resource development as a way to reduce
such risks. As the state controls access to resources, MNC’s were likely to meet these demands. Tugwell
assumed that relations between extractive MNCs and a state would be intrinsically unstable as a
result.151 This suggests that investment in extractive industries may also encourage mistrust between a
state and an MNC. A state under these conditions could be more likely to adopt proactive measures
against corporations that reduce corporate influence on policy making.
Tugwell also analyzed relations between oil MNCs and Venezuela. He claimed the ideology
driving oil policy in this state had been articulated by Perez Alfonso. Alfonso believed oil had “a high
intrinsic value” not reflected on international markets. Governments should therefore control these
resources to capitalize on their potential. Crucial components of this agenda were conservation and
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extensive taxation of MNCs.152 Successive governments implemented such policies and allowed the
state to assume control over increasing levels of revenue that investment had created. Yet relations
between governments and oil MNCs were not overly antagonistic. The state adopted a “conciliatory
attitude” towards the oil MNCs that made provocative measures more palatable. Other national issues
also spurred Venezuelan entry into its oil industry. Fiscal concerns forced the state to occasionally adopt
an agenda that favored “short-term consequences.”153 Thus, the state adopted a broad strategy
designed to maximize influence over the oil industry. This illustrates that obtaining shares of oil
revenues was an important objective for Venezuela. This further implies that the possibility of attaining
these revenues may influence governmental behavior.
Investment may affect government behavior in multiple ways. Rising levels of corruption would
have an adverse effect on a state’s political growth. Husted found corruption was significantly related to
higher levels of financial growth. He suggested dynamic economic growth was a strong predictor of
corruption in states that featured either a “collectivistic,” or paternalistic culture.154 Financial growth
may not contribute to corruption and growth may originate from sources aside from FDI, yet a state
without institutions or historical experiences that ensure transparency would be likely to witness an
increase in corruption. Thus, in some developing states, prosperity could lead to a decline in
transparency. Nontransparent institutions would have a negative impact on the political development of
a state.
Robertson and Watson explored the connection between FDI and corruption, hypothesizing that
FDI represented an opportunity to benefit from state resources. They observed that a rapid prosperity
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rise could be attributed to FDI, which could prompt leaders to “resort to corruption.” This led the
authors to suggest corruption levels could be connected to the speed with which investment entered or
exited a state.155 The authors empirically examined aspects of the relationship between FDI and
corruption and found them all to be significant. They suggested the connection between FDI and
corruption may be “bidirectional…with FDI flows affecting corruption.”156 Such findings imply that a
credible link between investment and deteriorating transparency is possible. This would further suggest
that investment can negatively affect political development.
Ross also made significant contributions to this theory. He suggested natural resource revenues
could be used to reduce pressure on governments for transparency. Such revenues enabled a regime to
reduce or eliminate political institutions that provide citizens an opportunity to critique their
government. For example, significant oil revenues may reduce a government’s need for tax revenues.
This may reduce citizen demands for transparency from the ruling regime. He also found that such
revenues could be exploited by autocrats as a way to reduce calls for political openness through reduced
taxation and generous social policies. This led Ross to conclude that increases in resource revenues
could have a negative impact on political development.157 Although oil revenues are not supplied by the
same actors who supply investment, the effects of oil revenues and investment appear to be similar. As
observed above, investment can lead to corruption, hampering political growth. A similar effect is
created by oil revenues. This would imply that, in appropriate contexts, the effects of oil revenues and
foreign investment are equally negative.
Winters and Gould examined the impact of foreign investment on political development in
Chad, which had gained significant revenues from natural resources. The authors observed that oil
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revenues had a deleterious effect on political development, despite efforts by the World Bank to
promote transparency. Chad was governed by an autocratic president who limited World Bank efforts to
promote transparency and the responsible use of oil revenues. The president was able largely able to
remove such restrictions by undermining political and civil society institutions.158 In this context, Winters
and Gould observed that natural resources made politics a “zero-sum contest” for the resourcegenerated revenues. The authors predicted that such funds would only “intensify domestic institutional
stress.” Indeed, after observing political developments in Chad, the authors claimed oil revenues had
actually contributed to the Chadian president’s autocratic consolidation.159 Such findings confirm that
revenues generated by extractive industries had a negative impact on political development in Chad.
The preceding examples suggest that investment generated revenues can have a negative
impact on political development in developing states. FDI may lead government officials to engage in
corrupt actions, yet the effect of FDI may also be more extreme than that. Ross claimed the revenues
that investment helped generate could empower a government to side step democratic constraints.
Examples from Chad appear to confirm Ross’ hypothesis.160 This indicates that oil revenues have the
potential to promote autocratic tendencies of states that are dependent on natural resources.
Robertson and Watson’s research suggested that FDI could contribute to corruption.161 This indicates
the effects of investment and resource revenues can have an equally negative effect on political
development.
However, such effects depend on the political conditions that predate investment. Bayulgen
observed that levels and types of FDI helped determine “regime trajectory.” She observed that
investment provided autocratic regime with an international “vote of confidence” through economic
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development. Others also found that oil-rich states receiving FDI were able to maintain autocratic
practices and subvert political reforms by promising returns from “oil boom prosperity.”162 This appears
to have happened in Kazakhstan. Pomfret noted that privatization had a negative impact on “the
institutional quality of the economy,” noting that the state scored poorly in measurements of
transparency and openness.163 These findings indicate that investment in Kazakhstan carried negative
repercussions. This also suggests that foreign investment has supplemented the regime’s ability to
consolidate power.
Initial investment conditions in Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan possessed elements that enable a state to attract investment. A crucial factor was
the structural reforms that were designed to attract FDI. A 1994 law shielded international investment
from “nationalization [and] expropriation, changes in legislation, and illegal action by state agencies or
officials.”164 Likewise, financial reorganization helped the state achieve stability and garnered nearly
USD 1.5 billion in foreign investment in 1999 and in 2000. Natural resources also played a major role in
attracting investment. Between 1993 and 1997, several large oil MNCs signed agreements to develop
fields in Kazakhstan.165 Bayulgen claimed that such changes enhanced the stature of the regime. She
observed that the regime was “dominant in the oversight of contracts with foreign companies,” noting
that prominent officials were responsible for reviewing investment agreements while deciding the
regime’s stake. Economic and political reforms, as well as natural resources, helped create economic
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growth. Yet such developments also boosted the standing of the regime. This enhanced standing is likely
to have helped President Nazarbayev consolidate power.
Early negotiations allowed foreign oil companies to extract favorable terms from the regime.
The terms of a deal between Chevron and the Soviet Union, who initiated the negotiations, gave
Chevron over 25 percent of revenues generated by the Tengiz field. Kazakhstani negotiators later
learned that “not a single lawyer [was part of] the Soviet delegation” during initial conferences.
President Nazarbayev initially faced criticism during this era. This was based on the perception that the
president was selling the state’s most valuable assets to international corporations. Indeed, pressure
was strong enough to force the president to promise “not to approve any deal that was
disadvantageous to Kazakhstan.”166 The president was also a minor figure during initial Tengiz
development negotiations. Talks began during the final years of the Soviet Union and Nazarbayev’s
position as president limited his importance. Yet Nazarbayev rose to prominence after Soviet rule
collapsed and he was able to call for new negotiations as an independent state. However, financial
needs forced the president to offer significant concessions in order to attract foreign investment, which
allowed oil MNCs to enter the state under favorable terms.167
Indeed, the state’s financial needs drove the regime to offer such incentives in order to draw
investment. According to Pomfret, the state endured a financial downturn in the early 1990’s. Likewise,
Kazakhstan’s GDP fell again in 1998 as a result of the “Russian [financial] crisis.”168 Oil MNCs frequently
offered some form of payment in recognition of these problems and as a prelude to negotiations. For
instance, early interactions with Omani representatives included the transfer of USD 100 million to help
feed livestock and prevent famine. When Mobil sought rights to develop a portion of the Tengiz field,
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the regime extracted a USD 145 million payment from the company before granting access to the
field.169 Such pressing needs illustrate why the regime chose to grant such concessions to oil companies.
The regime’s need for cash influenced its decision to offer favorable terms to foreign investors.
For example, the regime was willing to negotiate contracts “on a case-by-case basis” and offered
contractual inviolability as further incentives. Ahrend and Tompson considered this a crucial component
of the regime’s effort to attract investment.170 Initial agreements with Chevron included a clause that
allowed the company to avoid paying most of a USD 450 million signing bonus to Kazakhstan, should the
state failed to construct a pipeline to a coastal outlet. According to LeVine, these terms gave Chevron a
major stake in “the world’s sixth largest oil field…” for which the company paid “a paltry USD 30
million.”171
These terms gave foreign oil corporations significant influence over Kazakhstan’s oil industry.
Yet the regime eventually began to emphasize its control over this sector. The extensive allowances the
state offered help explain the changes the regime has implemented in contract negotiations. Ahrend
and Tompson have claimed the regime has begun to interpret contractual “provisions in favor of the
state…” They also claimed that this explained the regime’s assertion it was only reclaiming its rightful
stake in state resources.172 The regime was attempting to recoup some of the control over the oil
industry that it had lost as a result of concessions it had granted during the years following
independence.
Disputes over pipeline financing also constrained the regime. The state only held “one third of
the votes” in the CPC pipeline coalition, which made Kazakhstan the least influential actor in
negotiations over pipeline development. Disagreements also raised tensions between investing
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corporations and the regime, and threatened to shut construction down.173 The CPC pipeline was only
completed after a coalition of four companies, as well as Russia, Kazakhstan, and Oman agreed on
financing terms. As a result, the CPC pipeline “opened in October 2001, after at least 5
postponements…”174 It is also significant that the pipeline was only competed because an agreement
between CPC members, and the partnership of Arco and Lukoil, was reached. This compromise
incorporated a Russian firm, which was a political necessity. Indeed, LeVine reported that pipeline
development had experienced setbacks due to “insufficient Russian involvement.” As a result of these
negotiations, Kazakhstan only retained control of about 25 percent of the Tengiz field after these
conferences were completed.175 These conditions explain the regime’s subsequent efforts to establish
control over the oil industry.
Regime expansion into the oil industry
The Nazarbayev regime was able to gain control over the oil industry in Kazakhstan using two
specific policies. First, the regime made changes to its contractual relationships with oil MNCs by altering
legislative agreements. Second, the regime used its political influence to expand the role of domestic
companies within the oil industry. These developments allowed the regime to gain leverage over foreign
corporations, which allowed it to influence development in the oil sector and to prosper through
participation. Creation of a national oil company, or NOC, also represented an initial step in this process.
The NOC was created by combining state companies that managed development projects and “trunk
pipelines.” This merger allowed the regime to develop and implement a consistent agenda regarding
national resources. Indeed, Ahrend and Tompson observed that the regime specifically intended for the
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NOC to be part of an increase in governmental participation in the oil industry.176 However, these
changes contributed to non-democratic tendencies within the regime. As was previously noted,
revenues accrued by non-democratic leaders often enabled them to deflect criticism of their political
performance.177 This would allow the Nazarbayev regime to conduct its affairs with greater autonomy.
The policies the regime created for the NOC were consistent with its objective to actively
participate in the oil industry. A law issued in 2003 specified that agreements reached following
ratification were “subject to changes in legislation,” in addition to changes in global markets. The regime
also drafted legislation that required the NOC to automatically receive half of the available stakes in
potential projects.178 Domjan and Stone claimed this represented an attempt to generate greater
returns by expanding state participation through the NOC. This enabled the NOC to develop expertise
and the managerial experience necessary to operate on Caspian Sea fields.179 Creation of the NOC and
development of its technical capacities thus enabled the state to actively participate in Kazakhstan’s oil
industry. This participation expanded government involvement and helped the government gain control
over Kazakhstan’s oil sector.
The regime also used legislative changes and corporate shortcomings to expand its control over
the oil industry. Scholars considered implementation of a modified tax code to be an example of the
regime’s ability to control the oil industry. The regime approved an amendment that increased export
tax rates based on changes in the international price of oil. Yet the same scholar also observed that
these changes circumvented protections that were previously guaranteed, namely those that ensured a
fixed level of corporate taxation over the length of a contract. These provisions allowed the regime to
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capture between 65 and 85 percent of oil industry revenues.180 The regime also used corporate
shortcomings to expand control. The regime began to assert that oil corporations had not provided a
higher level of “management expertise” in field development, and began to hold multi-national firms
responsible for postponements. The regime accomplished this by forcing corporations to bear the
financial consequences of developmental delays.181 Thus, changes in taxation and assertions of
ineffectiveness enabled the regime to extract further concessions from oil companies and helped the
regime expand its leverage over the oil industry.
The regime also grew more assertive with oil MNCs regarding the speed of field development,
specifically over the pace of development at the Kashgan field. Initial projections suggested the field
would become operational in 2005, yet production had not begun in 2007 and was estimated to be
delayed until 2010. Development costs were also expected to double during this period. In early 2008,
estimates suggested that production would commence in 2011.182 These delays led the regime to audit
“subsoil contracts” with the intention of determining if agreements were breached. Scholars also
implied that these reviews were also intended to help the regime “maintain leverage over foreign
investors.”183 This suggested that production delays placed the regime in a position to exert influence
over oil MNCs operating in Kazakhstan.
Implementation of such policies as described above was designed to put “the burden of cost
overruns” on MNCs, which forced these corporations to accept the demands of the regime.184 These
actions also allowed the regime to force MNCs to comply with state demands and gave the regime
leverage over these corporations. For example, after a developmental delay at the Kashgan field in
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2007, the Prime Minister announced that the regime considered these delays to violate the operating
consortiums contractual agreements. The regime stated that it intended to counter violations with
“adequate measures.” Analysts also suggested that state agencies intentionally failed to meet their
contractual obligation, helping to create these developmental delays.185 Such conditions suggest the
regime adroitly utilized technical delays to renegotiate agreements. These developments also enabled
the regime to expand its bargaining control over foreign corporations.
Domjan and Stone observed that the regime also sought to expand participation beyond
development and into other areas of the oil industry. For instance, the regime signaled its desire for
Kazakhstani companies, particularly the NOC, to have an expanded role beyond field development as a
way of gaining management experience. To this end, the NOC purchased a Romanian oil refinery in the
mid-2000s. Scholars identified this as an attempt to expand the NOC’s assets to areas outside of field
development.186 Such actions indicate that the regime expects the NOC and other national firms to
participate in multiple areas within the oil industry. This expansion of domestic companies is likely to
give the state greater influence and the ability to extract greater revenues from the oil industry.
Investors encountering such conditions may consider withdrawal from a state. However, the
constraints that oil companies face make such actions difficult to consider. Ahrend and Tompson
observed that the significant monetary investment needed for oil field development created financial
deterrents that prevent corporations from leaving. Put simply, MNCs lose the ability to develop their
product if they leave the state. These disincentives also create an advantage for host states. Ahrend and
Tompson also observed that “once investments were initially made, and costs were sunk, it was
relatively easy for states to revise the terms of their interaction.” They also found the Nazarbayev
regime’s plan to increase its participation in the Kazakhstani oil industry were successful, in part,
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because of corporate hesitancy to abandon their investment. Thus, the regime was able to become
more assertive because of the prohibitive costs associated with a pullout of Kazakhstan.187 These limited
options allowed the regime to establish leverage over oil MNCs and gain greater control over the
national oil industry.
Evolution of the relationship between the regime and investors
The regime’s desire to regain revenue sources that were given as concessions following
independence partially explains the state’s interactions with the national oil industry. Yet the evolving
relationship between a resource rich state and investors can also explain such developments. Riches
observed that negotiating leverage between an oil supplier and a shipment corporation favors the
supplier prior to the completion of a transit route. A similar assessment can be made regarding oil field
development. A state that cannot finance the infrastructure necessary to capitalize on resources will
initially be dependent on foreign assistance. Yet as an “oil company sinks its money into a country, its
bargaining power with the state progressively declines over the length of the field.”188 Haggard made
similar observations regarding the bargaining power of an investing corporation vis-à-vis the host-state,
finding that initial conditions favored investors, yet shifted to the host state as the industry
developed.189 Thus, the negotiating leverage that the regime gained can also explain its recent ability to
extract concessions from investing multinationals.
These conditions contributed to the changes in negotiating leverage in Kazakhstan. Riches also
claimed that evidence of this transition could be observed in taxation clauses and “delays in the
definition of recoverable costs under the contract.”190 This shift in bargaining power coincided with
increased international demand for oil. One scholar observed that development of the state’s oil field, in
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addition to the increasing price of oil enabled the regime to establish control over oil MNCs “between
2004 and 2007.”191
Domjan and Stone categorized the state’s efforts to control the oil industry as “resource
nationalism.” They considered such policies to be profit motivated: “The aim [of the regime] has been to
improve the economic terms and long-term economic [benefits] of the country.” The regime pursued
these objectives in a variety of ways; however, a critical component of this process was the regime’s
tendency to expand government oversight of a project using the NOC, Kazmunaigaz. Others also
observed this trend. A key component of the regime’s strategy was legislation that mandated the
compulsory inclusion of the NOC in half of any development plan.192 Moreover, in the midst of a dispute
over development rights, the regime approved a provision that granted it “the right of first refusal” of
any plot for sale in currently developed fields. The provision even stipulated that the law “trumped the
terms of the contract itself.”193 Such provisions clearly indicate the regime was has established control
over Kazakhstan’s oil industry.
Domestic inclusion in the oil industry
Natural shifts in bargaining strength helped the regime establish control over the oil industry;
however, the regime soon developed the capabilities necessary to enter this sector. Kazakhstanis who
were employed by the oil industry gained technical experience during the early years of investment. This
empowered the state and also enabled the regime to establish negotiating leverage over oil MNCs.
Expertise also enabled the regime to develop state resources without investor assistance. Discontent
over the pace of development at the Kashgan field allowed the regime to review contractual
agreements with MNCs as a method of gaining control over these companies. Yet scholars also
suggested that such reviews were intended to steer “sub-contracting work” at multinational sites to
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domestic businesses, while also improving the “conditions for local workers.”194 This suggests the regime
utilized the improved skills of domestic workers to help the state operate independently of oil MNCs.
This ability also helped the regime create a larger role for itself within the oil industry.
The limited number of production sharing agreements, or PSAs, that the regime had recently
signed led Domjan and Stone to suggest that the regime is evaluating the NOC’s capacity to oversee a
project without foreign assistance.195 Ahrend and Tompson also observed that the regime took steps to
ensure that the NOC and other domestic firms had a role in subsequent exploration and development
efforts.196 Thus the regime appeared to have capitalized on the improved technical capacity of domestic
companies as a way to promote national involvement in the oil industry. Such efforts are likely to help
the regime maximize control over the oil industry.
Inclusion of domestic businesses was also enhanced by “learning within the state
administration,” and by foreign investors who granted the regime expanded oversight of projects.
Ahrend and Tompson observed that domestic companies were professionalized by exposure to the
advanced development methods that Western corporations employed. The regime utilized this
improvement to expand the role of domestic firms. Domjan and Stone observed that the regime
captured large amounts of revenue from the oil industry by enabling government-owned corporations
to occupy a large role in oil industry.197 This level of domestic participation is also likely to give the state
greater leverage in negotiations and may allow the regime to establish control over multiple areas
within the oil industry.
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As previously noted, scholars observed that the regime made efforts to “improve conditions for
local workers.”198 This appeared to have been a legitimate concern for the regime. For instance,
contractual agreements with major corporations included requirements to meet monetary needs,
donate to social causes, and to make up for local depression by compensating for “back wages, [and
rebuilding] factories and plants” in the area. Likewise, Domjan and Stone claimed that President
Nazarbayev paid deliberate attention to improving “standards of living, economic competitiveness,” and
structural upgrades. The president listed these as explicit policies that were implemented in his
“Kazakhstan 2030 economic plan.”199 The regime also used contract negotiations to create jobs.
Beginning in the 1990’s, employment of domestic workers became a “de facto performance
requirement.” By 2001, the regime had changed its proportioning structure regarding international
workers, which forced MNCs to hire more native laborers.200 These requirements enabled domestic
workers to gain the previously mentioned experience. Such steps may also have helped the regime
maintain its control over political life by deflecting criticism of the state’s economic performance.
Impact of expanded participation on political development
There were political ramifications to foreign investment in Kazakhstan. The regime’s expansion
into the oil industry altered the structure of political power and allowed the regime to consolidate its
control over the state. Indeed, scholars observed that investment is “the link between politics and
economics [and] is…the main factor for consolidating power” in contexts similar to Kazakhstan.201 This
connection embowered President Nazarbayev. Pomfret observed that the regime’s distribution of
development permits during the privatization process was considered a “corrupt process” that helped
create “a form of crony capitalism.” This indicated that the regime was able to use the investment
198
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process to enrich and empower itself. Pomfret also argued the long-term effects of the state’s resource
wealth would depend on its level of democratic development, “which does not augur well for
Kazakhstan.”202
Pomfret’s assessment of Kazakhstan’s potential was shared by others. Scholars have expressed
concerns based on observations of decision-making arrangements, which were decidedly nontransparent. They observed that investment deals were directly negotiated by the president and that
the regime did not even maintain the appearance of democratic accountability. For example, revenue
intended for the national resource fund was obscured by non-transparent policies. Indeed, nonexistent
“mechanisms of good governance” even prevented scholars from identifying the amount of revenue
collected by the national oil fund.203 Such assessments further indicate that the investment process
allowed the Nazarbayev regime to develop non-transparent tendencies. It is possible a lack of
democratic accountability promoted autocratic tendencies within the regime.
Yet international oil corporations have not displayed great concern over the effects of this
investment. Gulbrandsen and Moe examined oil MNC’s commitment to promoting good governance by
reviewing forums that promoted communication with the regime. These forums theoretically had the
capacity to influence policy, yet the authors observed that corporations did not criticize the regime’s
behavior. Rather, they only challenged the government on issues regarding these MNC’s primary
concerns.204 Indifference to broader political concerns may have also enabled autocratic tendencies
within the regime. Bayulgen observed that corporate concern over political conditions was confined to
the stabilization of the national “regulatory environment.” She also observed that investing companies

202

Pomfret, 872; although Pomfret was hopeful of a “Mexican-style revival.”
Franke, et. al., 124, 131.
204
Lars Gulbrandsen and Arild Moe, “Oil Company CSR Collaboration in ‘New’ Petro-States,”
Journal of Corporate Citizenship (Winter 2005): 60.
203

54
“did little to promote democracy across the region.”205 In this context, foreign investment appears to
have negatively influenced political development in Kazakhstan. The wealth FDI generated seems to
have enriched the regime, allowing these rulers to establish control over political life in Kazakhstan.
Conclusion
The conditions that Kazakhstan faced following independence led the regime to seek out
Western corporate investment in order to develop their natural resources. These efforts enabled the
state to develop the infrastructure necessary to exploit its natural resources. Yet Western inclusion also
left the state with diminished control over its own natural resources. According to analysts, such
arrangements grew “ever less palatable” with the continued rise in prices of oil.206 Such conditions
explain the regime’s subsequent attempts to emphasize its control over the oil industry. They also lend
credibility to the regime’s claim that “it is now merely reasserting its legitimate interests…that it had
previously been too weak to enforce.”207
The regime took steps to expand its role in the oil industry. A key factor in this process was the
development of the NOC, Kazmunaigaz. While the NOC has “limited capabilities,” the regime requires its
inclusion in half of any development venture.208 The regime also began to reconsider agreements with
foreign investors. One factor that helped the regime establish this control was a 2004 law that granted
the regime “the right of first refusal” on any share exchange in joint production arrangements. It is
significant that the law applies equally to extant and impending contracts. This will give the NOC, and
the regime, the ability to participate in any development project across the state. It is also significant
that the regime has interpreted this law as overriding any “rights [that] consortium owners might have
negotiated in the original contracts.”209 The regime also made efforts to include domestic corporations
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in development of the oil industry. Domjan and Stone claimed that this allowed domestic companies to
develop management experience.210 This will allow these companies to operate independently of MNCs
and will give the regime a greater capacity to develop its own resources. Such efforts created a greater
role for the regime within the oil industry and enabled it to control the oil sector in Kazakhstan.
These actions may be calculated steps taken by the Nazarbayev regime that are intended to
expand state control over the oil industry. Yet such developments also represent the natural evolution
in a relationship between an investor and the state. Riches observed an investor will gradually lose
negotiating leverage over a state as the field develops. He claimed a state will “almost predictably”
attempt to increase its share of natural resource control based on the decreasing leverage of an
investor.211 Other modifications the regime has made confirm this hypothesis. This suggests the regime
managed to cultivate control over investorsas a way to gain control over the state’s natural resources.
The regime’s expanded participation in the oil industry carried political ramifications. According
to Bayulgen, investment like Kazakhstan received has the potential to produce “regime persistence” if a
government already displayed autocratic tendencies.212Pomfret observed that the distribution of oil
field contracts was part of a “corrupt process” that affected Kazakhstan’s economy and had the
potential to influence the state’s political system.213 Foreign investors displayed little interest in the
political development of the state. Gulbrandsen and More observed interactions between the state and
oil companies and found that firms only challenged the regime when important issues when
threatened.214 This suggests that FDI impeded political development in Kazakhstan. FDI may have
enabled the regime to consolidate its control over the oil industry, enriching elites and severely
constraining political development as a result.
210

Domjan and Stone, 53.
Riches, 168.
212
Bayulgen, “Foreign Direct Investment in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” 52.
213
Pomfret, 872.
214
Gulbrandsen and Moe, 60.
211

56
Chapter IV: Political Development in Kazakhstan
Introduction
Kazakhstan achieved a striking level of economic development, yet this progress permitted
President Nazarbayev and his regime to consolidate power and stifle political development. Observers
noted that, although elections in Kazakhstan met the most basic criteria for a democracy, outcomes
were typically suspect. In 2007 legislative elections, the president’s party was the only organization that
won seats in the national assembly.215 Several factors allowed the president to strengthen his authority,
yet a key factor was corruption among figures in his administration. This reinforced the regime’s control
over the national economy and limited opportunities for further political growth.
The regime did not initially dominate political life. However, the president took steps soon after
independence to control the public sphere using decrees and legislative acts. For instance, the
government punished association “with the political parties and professional unions of foreign states.”
The government was also restructured to ensure that political power was highly centralized, and the
regime has hesitated to implement reforms which would empower regional officials.”216Such behavior
limited avenues for political opponents to openly criticize the regime. Such measures have strengthened
the president’s control over the state.
Yet the regime also employed indirect methods of power consolidation. This was achieved
through the corrupt actions of the president and his associates. Hill observed that the president’s
immediate family has become progressively more connected to vital business sectors, and that his
family “always tries to get a piece of the action.” Others echoed this concern. Opposition figures have
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claimed “the structure of power is totally corrupt.”217 Scholars also observed that actual political power
is concentrated around the president, his relatives and a few elites.218 The fact that power is
concentrated in such a tight circle also indicates an uneven distribution of authority, which also
constrains political development.
Revenues generated by oil boosted the regime’s control over Kazakhstan. Bayulgen claimed that
regimes who collect significant revenues can utilize tactics that are less repressive as a way to
consolidate power.219 This suggests that oil revenues allowed the regime to avoid blatantly autocratic
methods to control the state. Oil revenues also allowed the regime to manipulate its relationship with
foreign oil companies. Analysts observed that corporations must guard their investments from
continuous pronouncements and regulatory modifications.220 The ability to collect revenues appears to
have empowered the regime and has allowed it to extend its control over the political life.
Corruption among government officials also empowered the regime. Legal modifications
enabled the president to initially control the public sphere, yet the government’s interaction with both
foreign corporations and Kazakhstani society has been defined by corruption, which empowered the
regime. For instance, the regime occasionally neglected to announce changes to guidelines regarding
“customs exemptions…in the Law on Foreign Investment,” which allowed the regime to deal with
corporations individually, leading to uneven legal treatment. Such actions can be regarded as
corruption. Scholars defined corruption as an act that disregards the official government responsibilities
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in favor of financial advancement or prestige.221 Such behavior has allowed the regime to strengthen its
control over the oil industry and over the country. Control over this resource has helped the regime
consolidate power and may have prevented political development.
Historical Influences on Political Development
Multiple factors can explain the prevalence of such behaviors in Kazakhstan. The lack of political
development can partially be explained by the state’s Soviet heritage. Scholars claimed that Central
Asian states maintain Soviet-style policies following independence. National leaders were simply “party
bosses, who changed their communist lapel pins for nationalist ones…”222 Others observed that
members of Kazakhstan’s communist party retained their position and responsibilities following
independence.223 In 2001, 86 percent of Kazakhstani elites had been members of the state’s communist
party. Murphy also observed almost no noteworthy alterations to national elite or among “intra-elite
relationships” as of 2002, except that the office of the president had been empowered.224 This indicated
that Kazakhstan maintained several elements of communist rule following independence. The
persistence of Soviet holdovers may explain the state’s lack of political growth.
Political power in Kazakhstan is concentrated around the President and a close circle of
relations. Such behavior may be connected to the state’s cultural identity. Scholars note that power
consolidation in Kazakhstan created a “neo-patrimonial system based on trust and kinship.”225 Others
noted that leaders are dependent on unofficial associations that are based on Kazakhstan’s social
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structure.226 The social importance of these groups may have inadvertently hampered political
development. Collins claimed these clans played an important role in social identification. Groups were
organized around familial relations and location. Such relationships also served as a support system for
citizens, leading Collins to observe that “kin-based patronage and reciprocity” sustained citizens during
economic downturns. Clan membership provided material goods and social support during periods of
Soviet neglect. This led scholars to suggest the president may have exploited these relationships to
consolidate political authority.227 Such actions also explain the state’s lack of political development.
Indeed, Collins believed clan identification was detrimental to Kazakhstani’s reliance on national
institutions.228
Yet the precise role of clans following independence remains unclear. Clan-based relationships
have played an important role in Kazakhstani society and this type of relationship had the potential to
undermine development and growth of official institutions.229 However, these problems do not
sufficiently explain the state’s shortcomings. Murphy suggested that the political clout of national elite
and “plain nepotism” explained the Kazakhstan’s political development.230 Regardless or the source,
political leaders have been able to maintain their office while curbing political freedoms. Such behaviors
have strongly contributed to the state’s current political climate and may have cultivated a culture of
corruption among elites.
Early Power Consolidation
These conditions slowly developed after the state gained independence. The legislative efforts
that the regime used illustrate how the regime was able to consolidate its political authority. Kazakhstan
initially featured elements of an open civil society. Zhovtis observed that the national media was
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essentially free of government control for the several years following independence. She also claimed
that a degree of tolerance for public associations and independent organizations also existed during this
period.231 Olcott also observed that the state had developed a dynamic media and that the national
parliament had acted as an effective check on presidential authority during this period.232 Political
growth may have occurred in Kazakhstan, had these institutions continued to develop.
These institutions were soon subjected to government control. In 1997, the government
required media outlets to buy “rights to certain frequencies,” and charged exorbitant fees for these
licenses. Zhovtis believed such actions shut down non-government media outlets across the country.
The regime employed similar tactics to gain control over private groups. A 1998 law forced organizations
to pay an enrollment tax in order to gain legal recognition.233 The meetings of public associations were
also supervised by governmental representatives to ensure their legality. This body of laws had multiple
facets which limited the actions and influence of private organizations. For example, it became illegal for
a public association to interfere “with the activities of state agencies.” Other provisions penalized
coordination with international political organizations.234 These laws helped the government cement its
control over private organizations in Kazakhstan, and restricted organizations that were capable of
criticism. Such developments also helped the president establish control over the state.
The regime also manipulated the structure of the national government. The state’s first
constitution created a strong central government. As a result, regional officials had little unilateral
powers. The regime also chose not to empower regional governors. According to Olcott, a strong central
government guaranteed that regions were reliant on the national government to respond to local
concerns. This prevented regions with different ethnic compositions from developing an independent
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power base.235 This system also allowed the regime to organize the federal government in a way that
empowered the national government and enabled the president to control the governing process.
Constitutional reforms in 1995 further expanded the president’s control over the state. The
1995 Constitution granted more authority to the Office of the President. Executive orders also became
equivalent to law, while the national and regional assemblies lost several political powers.236 The
national Parliament was redesigned to receive legal proposals submitted directly by the president. The
regime also ensured supremacy in the national legislature by altering its composition. The new
constitution still allotted two senators per oblast; however, the president gained the ability to appoint
additional senators to the legislature. The president also gained authority to dismiss the national
assembly and to fill important offices. Indeed, the only limitation on presidential authority was illness or
treason, which required a majority vote in both legislative houses.237 Such changes clearly enhanced the
scope of presidential authority and further limited opportunities for political opponents to challenge the
regime.
Indirect means of consolidation
While the regime used legislative acts to control the state, other factors also enabled the regime
to consolidate power. Such factors are distinct because they have strengthened the authority of the
regime, without damaging its public image. For example, Bayulgen suggested that foreign investment
assisted the regime’s efforts to consolidate power. She speculated that international investment in
state-owned business can provide a regime with international support, helping ensure the viability of
that government. She also speculated that foreign revenues helped such governments survive by
influencing “the distribution of power among political actors…” This would imply that investment in
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Kazakhstan’s oil industry helped President Nazarbayev strengthen his control over the state. However,
Bayulgen also observed that the effect of such revenues “depends significantly on the nature of the
existing regime.”238 Such revenues appear to have strengthened the autocratic tendencies of the regime.
Revenue generation helped explain the president’s ability to consolidate political authority.
Bayulgen also noted that foreign capital provided to state-owned businesses or to corporations that rely
on government support can create common interests between international investors and political elite,
which can undermine calls for political reforms. Moreover, FDI does not necessary cause investors to
advocate for domestic reforms. Rather, corporate concern is likely to be restricted to portions of the
legal code that directly affect investment. This led Bayulgen to claim that regimes which receive such
investment can employ a “milder version of authoritarian rule” as a means of consolidation.239
The president was also able to maintain a more tolerant style of autocratic rule by appointing
supporters to privileged positions in the government. The president had altered the process of
nominating akims, or regional governors, in order to consolidate his authority. The president initially
appointed officials who were politically supported by a region, yet when these officials began to act
autonomously, the president replaced them with personal supporters who were politically indebted to
the president. This enabled the regime to fill political positions with candidates who were less likely to
become political opponents.240 Such actions allowed the regime to strengthen its control over regional
governments and limited opportunities for political rivals to develop.
Other scholars have observed that the regime was able to utilize subtle tactics to consolidate
power. Schatz claimed that “soft-authoritarian regimes” were more likely to employ methods that were
designed to win public support rather than resort to overt repression. Such regimes used manipulation
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and constructed “images of state and society” to gain public support. This behavior allowed the regime
to avoid traditional means of control. Instead, the regime could limit the development of opposing
narratives instead of having to confront them. Schatz claimed the Nazarbayev regime was adept at this
type of narrative construction.241 Such conditions suggest that indirect methods and even investment
enabled the regime to establish control over political life in Kazakhstan.
The regime was able to deploy these indirect means to influence public opinion in Kazakhstani
society. Nurbulat Masanov, a prominent political opponent, was belittled as a puppet for foreign
governments and for his alleged support “of the west’s agenda.” This allowed the regime to cast doubt
on Masanov’s intentions and to undermine his political arguments. Schatz also observed that the
national parliament would casually, with presidential backing, propose stringent legislative acts which
the president could veto in order to present himself as a “champion of moderation.” Schatz believed this
behavior weakened the legitimacy of political challengers and enabled the regime to avoid direct means
of repression.242
The regime also employed indirect means to influence the outcome of national elections.
Elections conducted in 1999 were considered impartial, “but not without irregularities.” For instance,
Akehezan Kazhegelden, a former Prime Minister who joined an opposition group, was arrested after
declaring himself a candidate for the national assembly. These actions led Western delegates of the
OSCE to describe the election as extremely unfair.243 The speed with which these elections were
conducted was also problematic. Elections that were scheduled for January 1999 were actually held in
early October of the preceding year. Olcott claimed this was intentionally designed leave opposition
figures with an insufficient amount of time to mount an effective challenge. The regime also added
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prohibitive qualifications to candidate requirements. A candidate was expected to gather 120 thousand
signatures, pass a language test, and provide a USD 3000 registration fee.244 These additional
qualifications helped the regime manipulate the electoral process to their advantage.
Yet it should be noted that President Nazarbayev maintains a degree of legitimacy and even
popularity in Kazakhstan. According to scholars, the president’s term was legally extended through “a
referendum and a series of parliamentary votes.”245 Many Kazakhstani view the president as well
intentioned. A journalist reported that citizens considered the president a preferable alternative to the
Soviet Union, even if he was a corrupt leader. Others were not concerned by rumors of corruption,
claiming the president “cares about the people and does things for the country.” Likewise, many assume
that if the state is rich with natural resources, then the president should be equally wealthy.246Such
statements suggest that international criticisms of the regime are not relevant in Kazakhstan, as average
citizens appear to be content with the regime’s leadership.
It is possible that the regime’s ability to avoid use of repressive tactics has mitigated public
criticisms of the regime. Nevertheless, freedoms for opposition figures are curtailed. Olcott observed
that Kazakhstan featured an empowered presidency, while political dissidents face stringent restrictions
on their activities.247 Yet such conditions do not appear to concern average citizens. If the regime’s only
interaction with society was repression of political opponents, it could not maintain popularity. These
conditions indicate that the regime has found ways to generate political support among Kazakhstani
citizens. Such efforts also provided the Nazarbayev regime with legitimacy.
Corruption
Corruption presents a serious challenge to political development around the world. A definition
of corruption is necessary to explain the actions that members of the president’s family have taken, and
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how they qualify as corruption. A brief examination of corruption will also explain how this problem
affects political development. Transparency International defined corruption as the misuse of authority
to accrue personal advances.248 Other scholars defined corruption as a relationship amongst parties in
which once seeks to “influence the allocation of resources” and as the abuse of shared responsibility for
individual means. Such behavior has repercussions on political development because it establishes an
informal alternative to official channels and undermines official institutions.249 Thus, while details vary, it
is evident that corruption involves the misuse of government authority to benefit one’s self. Moreover,
corrupt actions appear to empower individuals at the expense of the state. This can generate mistrust
and cynicism towards a government and may ultimately undermine the legitimacy of the state.
Elements of corruption are present in Kazakhstan. For instance, journalists have expressed
concern over the management of the national oil fund, which is currently supervised by associates of the
president and whose expenditures are not clearly earmarked.250 Likewise, the ERBD ranked Kazakhstan
22nd of 27 “transition economies” that suffer from corruption. Other surveys found that as much as five
percent of business returns were used for bribery. Other scholars characterized Kazakhstan as being one
of “the world’s most corrupt and ineffective states.”251 Corruption clearly represents a serious problem
in Kazakhstan. The lack of transparency and misuse of authority that corruption entails poses serious
political challenges to affected states.
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The regime was able to consolidate political power through corrupt actions. This consolidation
was manifested in two ways. The first method involved the sale of state assets to foreign investors. The
second method of power consolidation developed through the control that president’s family as able to
assert over sectors of the national economy, especially the oil sector. This suggested that the regime and
other members of the national elite engaged in corrupt actions, which allowed them to amass a
personal fortune. The regime’s ability to directly affect the national economy in this fashion also
influenced political development.
The privatization process was heavily criticized as corrupt. Analysts observed that most business
deals were made without public scrutiny. Scholars observed that negotiations over foreign business
contracts are primarily conducted by the president, whose decision is considered legally valid.252 Olcott
observed that the president and his entourage enjoyed an extravagant lifestyle as a result of foreign
investment. She recorded an episode in which they spent roughly USD 250,000 while shopping.
Likewise, a steel plant with a projected billion dollar “replacement fee” was sold for a significantly lower
amount. Rumors suggested President Nazarbayev, who had worked at this plant, also profited from the
transaction.253 Such conditions indicate that the president, his family, and political supporters became
wealthy as a result of privatization. Such behaviors would qualify as corruption.
The regime was also slow to issue operating licenses to oil companies. According to scholars,
this made corporations susceptible to state inspections, which had the capacity to halt production for
those corporations without a license. Yet as of 2005, the legal requirements of these permits had not
been ratified by the government, which renders these licenses “impossible to legally obtain.” Neither
did the government provide guidelines on the application of laws regarding “customs exceptions” and
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foreign investment. This led to an arbitrary enforcement of these laws.254 This behavior allowed the
regime to assert control over the oil industry through seemingly legal implementation of vague laws.
These tendencies have allowed the regime to further assert control over the oil industry, enriching the
state in the process.
Such actions qualify as corruption. Scholars have also defined corruption as actions taken by
government representatives that are inconsistent with relevant normative assumptions.255 For example,
foreign oil companies in Kazakhstan sought contractual guarantees upon entering the state. Yet as of
2003, investments no longer enjoyed “the degree of protection and contract stability that had been
available hitherto…”256 It should be noted that Kazakhstani officials have defined such behavior as a
reassertion of state interests that had been unenforceable, yet such behavior would also “violate
established norms” of the international community.257 Such actions were likely to empower the regime,
by allowing it to further cement its control over the state and over the oil industry. Yet international
observers would also be likely to consider the regime’s behavior non-transparent and corrupt.
Corruption among government officials
Corruption among the national elite may also limit opportunities for political reform. Some have
observed that members of the national elite exercise a significant level of control over business deals,
many of which are made in a non-transparent fashion.258 Scholars also observed that the president
occupies a central role in the negotiation of “international business contracts on oil and gas
exploration.” The ability of public officials to conduct such negotiations presented several opportunities
for corruption. The same scholars also claimed that the government no longer bothers to maintain the
appearance of a transparent regime, noting that agreements negotiated by President Nazarbayev
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“effectively serve as a contract.”259 Business dealings in Kazakhstan are clearly non-transparent, which
creates the possibility for corruption among government officials. Such behavior has the potential to
limit economic growth. Ahrend and Tompson observed that erratic application of “customs regulations
and tax laws” may limit trade opportunities. Such actions are also likely to empower officials who
oversee the oil industry.260 Moreover, the ability of officials to behave in this fashion also reinforces
government control over the oil industry and allows the regime to assert its political authority.
The government was able to extract concessions by requiring foreign corporations to maintain
political connections to the regime. Analysts observed that “a joint venture with a well-connected local
partner” is a crucial precondition to entering the state.261 Such requirements also created opportunities
for corruption. Pomfret noted that many of the regime’s negotiations with US companies involved
instances of corruption. For example, officials of major US oil companies were party to legal cases that
involved several million dollars that were deposited “through a US intermediary into offshore accounts
of senior Kazakh officials.”262 This implied that bribery was essential to establishing a relationship with
political elites and that some form of payoff played a role in corporate entry into Kazakhstan. As
previously noted the ability of the regime to extract such concessions helped it regulate entry and
allowed them to exercise control over the oil industry.
The regime was also prepared to intimidate non-compliant corporations. Scholars noted that
low level officials were able to make “life impossible for those without the right connections or unwilling
to pay a necessary bribe.” The same scholar observed that smaller “oil-extracting companies were taken
over by people from the [center] of the country.”263 Others observed that such conditions also created
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“new opportunities for patronage” by giving national elites the ability provide followers opportunities
for financial windfalls and further allowed the regime to establish control over the oil industry.264
Corruption among the president’s family
This behavior empowered the regime and allowed the president’s family to gain influence over
areas of the national economy. Dariga Nazarbayeva, one of the president’s daughters, was head of a
national media outlet and was active in national politics. Nazarbayeva established “her own political
party” in 2005 and led experts to speculate that she was poised to succeed the president if he ever left
office.265 Such connections indicate that segments of Kazakhstani society outside of the executive
branch are controlled by parties loyal to the president. If Nazarbayeva was able to gain her positions as a
result of her father, such conditions may qualify as corruption.
Other members of the president’s family used their political connections to accrue a personal
fortune. The president’s son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev, exploited his position in the government for
personal gain. Kulibayev was appointed as a vice president of the national oil company after the turn of
the century. Shortly thereafter, Nelson Resources, a Canada-based company, purchased a majority stake
in several oil fields around Kazakhstan. The caused the “market capitalization” of the company to grow
to roughly USD One billion. This growth was significant because the “financial and political forces behind
Nelson resources were Kulibayev and his associates.” Such actions certainly qualified as corruption and
would be considered an abuse of “collective responsibility for private ends.”266 This behavior also
empowered the president’s family and others connected to his regime and enabled them to further
expand their control over the state’s natural resources.
This behavior had a wider effect on political development in Kazakhstan. According to scholars,
the empowerment of relatives ensured that “power and wealth [stayed] in the family,” which also
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empowered the president.267 The president’s ability to enrich his associates also allowed the president
to create a patronage system with important figures in the oil industry. The regime pursued a similar
strategy with appointees to political office. These figures also allowed the regime to establish control
over distant regions in Kazakhstan. Such behavior was significant because it allowed the president to use
his influence to place supporters in office. Such behavior allowed the president to control institutions
which may have produced a political opponent.268
These actions are also considered forms of corruption. As previously noted, corruption can be
defined as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain…”269 The wealth generated by the president’s
family and associates has originated from a misuse of authority. For example, regarding the regime’s
interest in smaller oil corporations, government officials realized “that their signature [meant] money,
making life impossible for those without the right connections, or unwilling to pay the necessary
bribes.”270 These actions suggest that members of the president’s administration benefitted through
improper use of their position. This behavior thus empowered the regime and strengthened its control
over the oil industry and over the state.
Yet it is important to note that the regime had already established control over government
institutions by the time officials began to act in this manner. Interaction with oil corporations only
allowed the president to solidify his position. The regime had moved against independent media groups
and oppressed opposition figures throughout the 1990’s, effectively limiting political growth in
Kazakhstan. Yet the oil industry did not generate significant revenues until 2000.271 Thus, oil revenues
empowered the regime, but the regime had already begun to display autocratic tendencies. Yet oil
revenues assisted the regime in their efforts to limit political opposition by giving it the ability to place
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supporters in positions of power. This ability to influence the shape of the government was also a crucial
component of the consolidation process. These behaviors further enabled the regime to establish
control over the state.
Such behavior is also likely to perpetuate corruption. Scholars observed that rent-seeking led to
continued “abuse of revenue from resources for the personal gain of elites.”272 Others observed that
regional governors spent their administrative terms primarily accruing personal wealth instead of
working to improve the well-being of their provinces.273 Scholars considered this an indication that
“political elites” were isolated from public opinion and from any consequences, as corruption of this
magnitude isolated the regime from average citizens. This hindered the state’s political development.
Elite control of natural resources allowed the regime to purchase support and undermine opponents.
These actions helped the regime maintain control over the state. Such manipulation has limited political
development and suggests that further political reforms are “unlikely.”274
Oil Revenues and Democratic Development
These developments indicate that democratic development is improbable in the foreseeable
future. The regime’s ability to utilize its wealth to stifle opposition movements has limited the potential
for the emergence of a representative government. Yet the broader relationship between oil revenues
and political development remains a point of debate among scholars. Ross observed that oil wealthy
governments can evolve into “rentier states,” in which revenue from international sources flows to the
national government. Such conditions are problematic if the state’s citizens solely take part in spending
these rents. Thus, oil revenues can reduce demand for political reform. Revenues enable a regime to
spend greater amounts on political support, “which, in turn, dampens latent pressure for
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democratization.”275 Others do not consider resource-generated wealth to be harmful. Michael Herb
found that revenue rents can be used to develop a “middle class, increase GDP per capita, and drive of
other measures of development,” all of which are associated with democratic governments. This led him
to suggest that resource-driven growth did not necessarily prevent democratic development.276 Such
findings indicate that the impact of such resources may depend on how revenues are spent.
Okruhlik made similar arguments. She noted that, while international groups help finance
rentier states, such a definition overlooks the role of politics in economic development. More
specifically: “Money does not spend itself. Those acting in the name of the state make decisions and the
nature of the regime influences them.” Okruhlik concluded that rentierism theories required elaboration
based domestic institutions, which influenced the decision-making process.277 Such findings are
consistent with previous observations about the effects of FDI. Bayulgen observed that the effects of
this investment were highly dependent on the behavior of the sitting governments. These findings have
negative implications for the state, given the regime’s tendency for autocratic rule.278 Such conditions
suggest that resource rents and FDI alike have enabled the regime to consolidate power and to limit
political reforms in Kazakhstan.
Rentierism in Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan has encountered such problems. As previously observed, the government was
successful in attracting investment from abroad. Scholars observed that the state, in addition to other
Central Asian republics, attracted the largest levels of rents among CIS states.279 Observers also noted
that, as of 2004, roughly USD 29.5 billion was invested in natural resources in Kazakhstan. However, this
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investment led to a decline in transparency. Others observed that the state only initiated political
reforms that would enable it to draw foreign investment.280 Thus, the state was able to draw
investment, however; the reforms that drew FDI did not include efforts to promote political openness.
This further suggests the regime used investment as a means of power consolidation.
Rentier characteristics can also be illustrated through taxation levels. Reports by the OECD
suggested the state collected “the lowest general government revenue and expenditure as a share of
GDP…on 2001 returns.” As Ross observed, oil revenues can offset low levels of tax revenues. This can
lead to a situation in which citizens become unlikely to demand governmental reforms.281 It is possible
that oil revenues have enabled the regime to avoid taxation of citizens. Yet oil rich regimes must find
ways to “legitimize their power.” The Nazarbayev regime accomplished this through expanded
provisions for retirees and increased social spending.282 Moreover, in speeches made in 2005, the
president detailed several policies that were intended to raise incomes and construct new housing
complexes, among other objectives.283 Such programs may be a part of a broader development plan. Yet
such conditions may help explain the regime’s popularity and lack of demand for political reform.284
Ross observed that leaders of oil-rich states were able to employ revenues to blunt calls for
political reform.285 Others have also expressed concern over the connection between oil revenues and
the lack of political development. Scholars observed that political parties in Kazakhstan were weak
organizations, unsupported by the general public. Political power was instead based around “former
Soviet economic structures and new business groups,” manifested as parties devoted to an individual or
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as oligarchs, all of whom were devoted to the president.286 Perhaps as a result, there were few
connections between parties and average citizens. Olcott also observed that few elements in the state
appeared capable of creating independent parties. Moreover, opposition parties that are formed are
created by the regime and are used to distribute services, but do not function as training grounds for
potential leaders.287 Such conditions further establish that the regime is able to control several elements
within Kazakhstan’s political system, limiting competition as well as opportunities for political reform.
Such problems are intensified by corruption. Pomfret observed that “rent-seeking of the late
1990’s” and the actions of national figures rendered political reforms improbable.288 Others have
observed that leaders in Kazakhstan are considered to be “among the worlds most corrupt…using
bribes, abuse and repression to retain power.” They also noted that such behavior disregarded calls for
political reforms and had the potential to threaten commerce.289 Pomfret also speculated that resource
revenues would either encourage development “with equity or they will enrich a self-perpetuating elite”
with the capacities to undermine reforms. It is evident that resource revenues were used to make
political leaders wealthy. Such problems will continue to plague Kazakhstan so long as current elites
remain in power.
Conclusion
Kazakhstan weathered several challenges following independence, yet the state continues to
suffer from problems stemming from its corrupt government. Several international organizations have
categorized the state as plagued by corruption. Freedom House Index categorically ranked the state as
“not free.”290 Such conditions have unquestionably had an impact on the state’s political development.
Scholars observed corruption in the state has enabled leaders to isolate themselves from the public
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opinion of citizens.291 Such behavior has reduced the probability of political reform. The ability of leaders
to enrich themselves through non-transparent means limited the opportunity for a meaningful
opposition to the regime to develop.
Yet Kazakhstan’s political climate was not exclusively created through corruption. The regime
took steps to limit the influence of political opponents almost immediately after the state achieved
independence. Legislation passed in the 1990’s prohibited citizens from association with “political
parties and professional organizations of foreign states.”292 Such mechanisms and others allowed the
regime to limit opportunities for opposition groups to take part in the political process. Using legislative
methods to control opposition groups also allowed the regime to consolidate power and limit the
emergence of political challengers.
Oil revenues and FDI further enhanced the regime’s control over the state. This occurred in
several ways. The investment that natural resources drew lent the regime credibility and helped
undermine calls for political reform. Investment also gave the regime the ability empower political allies
and enter important sectors of the national economy, most notably the oil sector. Bayulgen observed
that regimes receiving investment were able to impose “a milder version of authoritarian rule” without
resorting to outright repression.293 This suggested that revenues allowed the regime to enhance its
authority without resorting to force. Such conditions also ensured that foreign corporations would be
forced to cooperate with regime and further allowed the president to consolidate power.
Kazakhstan was also categorized as a “rentier state,” or one in which wealth that is generated by
natural resources is collected and distributed by the government.294 Scholars suggest Kazakhstan has
developed into such a state. The national economy improved due to oil revenues, which allowed the

291

Franke, et. al., 127.
Zhovtis, 65.
293
Bayulgen, 50.
294
Ross, 329-30.
292

76
state to collect a high level of rents.295 Multiple indicators confirm this assessment: tax returns in 2001
were among the lowest levels of government revenue received in former Soviet states.296 As Ross
observed, oil wealth states were able to avoid heavily taxing citizens, which in turn, reduced calls for
transparency. Likewise, the resource revenues that the Nazarbayev regime collected were used to fund
social benefits.297These conditions suggest that Kazakhstan is developing as a rentier state. Such
conditions helped the regime avoid criticism and limited opportunities for further political development.
The Nazarbayev regime displayed autocratic tendencies since coming to power. The regime also
managed to prevent political challenges from arising through oppressive, indirect, and subtle means.
The regime initially limited political freedoms, through legislation, later appointing political allies to
office as a way to maintain control over regional provinces.298 Corruption also allowed the regime to
expand its control over political life. Such conditions created a political system which Olcott described as
an empowered presidency and opposition groups with strict limitations on their activities.299 Political
reforms will not take root until the state has eliminated corrupt practices and reformed its autocratic
government. However, such reforms are unlikely. Scholars, in reference to Azerbaijan, noted that “there
is no sustainable and democratic alternative to the ruling elites…” Such conditions also exist in
Kazakhstan.300
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Chapter V: Conclusion
Effects of foreign investment on Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan’s economic growth was astonishing. A state that had been deeply incorporated into
the Soviet economy was able to attract nearly USD 30 billion by 2005.301 It is also impressive that the
state was able draft the necessary legislative reforms that attracted this investment. These reforms
helped draw over USD two billion per year to develop Kazakhstan’s natural resources after 2001. The
state’s resources were primarily responsible for the state’s growth and helped the state recover from
initial setbacks.302 However, there were also negative consequences to resource-driven development.
For instance, World Bank officials observed that corrupt behavior has disproportionately benefitted
Kazakhstani elite, expanding the gap between the wealthy and impoverished.303 Effectively,
Kazakhstan’s mineral resources helped President Nazarbayev and his regime expand their control over
the state, distorting political development in Kazakhstan.
Unfortunately, the investment that helped the state achieve this growth may have also
contributed to Kazakhstan’s political dilemmas. Indeed, the state’s political climate encouraged misuse
of oil revenues. Bayulgen observed that authoritarian states were particularly suited to draw foreign
investment, and were able to bolster their regime as a result. She claimed autocratic states can
guarantee limited opposition to corporate entry, and can help foster a stable setting for their
investment.304Moreover, corporations investing in an autocratic state are unlikely to press for
democratic reforms within host-states. Bayulgen also observed that investors are likely to only lobby the
government on issues related to their investment, particularly guarantees of property protection and
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consistent regulations.305 Others even have observed that corporations take care to not challenge an
autocratic regime for fear of retaliation.306 Thus, autocratic states can provide an investment context
suitable to corporations, who appear to be unwilling to confront this government over broader political
issues. Such conditions allow authoritarian regimes to enhance their control over state institutions,
limiting political development.
Autocratic states benefit from the structure of foreign investment, particularly FDI. Bayulgen
found that FDI helped empower autocratic regimes by providing them with implicit support and by
effectively allowing elites to outspend political rivals, which further enabled such governments to
maintain their authority.307 Others noted that FDI affected political development. Referring to
Kazakhstan, scholars found investment negatively shaped the national economy and the political
system, suggesting the “link between politics and economics” was the crucial feature of the regime’s
ability to consolidate power. This led the authors to claim oil revenues enabled the regime to establish
control over the state and to limit reform.308 Thus, while FDI clearly helped Kazakhstan achieve
economic growth, it also enabled the regime to manipulate the political process for its own advantage.
FDI also led to instances of corruption, which further enhanced the regime’s control over
Kazakhstan. A key feature of these efforts was the regime’s interaction with the oil industry. Scholars
observed that constantly modified regulations, in addition to arbitrary application allowed the regime to
extract concessions from the oil industry. The addition of a domestic investor to an international
investment group was a necessity in order to enter the state. The regime also appeared to demand
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bribes before allowing investors to develop state resources.309 The regime’s efforts to extract
concessions are indicative of its attempts to gain control over the oil industry. The ability to draw such
revenues has also helped the regime establish control over the state.
Scholars have also recorded multiple episodes in which members of the regime were able to
assert control over the state itself by using corrupt practices. For instance, the president directly
selected regional governors and chose from supporters that were indebted to the president. These
administrators usually spent their terms fleecing the region instead of serving public interest. Such
conditions qualify as corruption. Scholars have defined corruption as activities that determine
distribution of state resources in addition to the “abuse of public or collective responsibility for private
ends.”310 Moreover, these officials allowed the president to limit the emergence of political figures who
could challenge the regime by ensuring appointees were loyal to the president.311 Thus, the regime’s
ability to appoint these ministers was the result of a corrupt process and allowed it to further establish
control over the state.
Such conditions confirm that oil revenues had a strong influence on political development in
Kazakhstan.Resource development has a profound effect on political systems. Development contributed
to “illegal rent-seeking behavior,” while permitting these states to project an image of perpetual growth,
which reduced calls for political reforms. Thus, scholars claimed that a “rent-seeking orientated policy”
allowed the president and the regime to provide political allies with lucrative opportunities.312 Oil
revenues effectively allowed the regime to reward supporters while simultaneously disenfranchising
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opposition. These revenues also contributed to the state’s culture of corruption and have allowed the
regime to delay political development.
These conditions indicate that Kazakhstan has become a rentier state, or one in which revenues
are collected from international groups by state governments. According to Ross, such states collect
enough revenue from natural resources that they can avoid high taxation levels, and reduce calls for
accountability. Observing Middle Eastern states, Ross noted that oil rich governments can develop
budgets that are not constrained by the domestic tax base, which enhanced their ability to reduce
oppositional threats.313 Others observed that such conditions tend to dampen democratic development.
Traditionally, “independent middle and labour classes” are necessary components of democratic
reforms. Yet in a rentier state, these groups are replaced by recipients of rentier wealth and are
dependent on “rent opportunities” as a result.314 Such patterns are prevalent in Kazakhstan.
The state had collected a minimal amount of revenue from 2001 tax returns and, as previously
observed, by 2004 the state collected almost USD 30 billion in foreign investment.315 Such conditions
certainly indicate that the state was able to draw significant levels of investment, which are likely to
influence political development. Moreover, the regime also implemented social policies which provided
citizens with expanded services. For example, President Nazarbayev referenced government programs
in a 2005 speech that were designed to raise government salaries and to create “new housing
programs…”316 It is probable that economic rents expanded the regime’s ability to carry out such
policies. Ross categorized such activities as a “spending effect” of rentierism, or one that allowed the
regime to spend greater amounts on political supporters, which reduces calls for democratic
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transitions.317 Such conditions indicate that Kazakhstan has become a rentier state, whose government
is able to subvert calls for political reform.
Effects of resource-driven economic growth on political life
However, it must be observed that the regime had already displayed autocratic tendencies prior
to the oil industry takeoff. Scholars observed that the regime took steps during the 1990’s to establish
control over independent social groups and over the media itself. The oil industry did not generate
significant revenues until 2000, at the earliest.318 This indicated that the regime had already begun to
consolidate power prior to oil industry growth. The oil boom also allowed the regime to alter power
consolidation methods; resource revenues can enable a government to lower taxes and reduce calls for
political participation.319 Thus, resource-generated revenues may allow a regime to increasingly control
a pacified public. Scholars have connected this trend to foreign investment. Bayulgen suggested that FDI
had the capacity to shape power distribution, which, in turn, had the potential to empower autocratic
leaders. This led her to conclude that the effect of such investment depended on the behavior of the
regime receiving investment.320 Such effects indicate that foreign investment allowed the Nazarbayev
regime to enhance previous efforts of power consolidation.
These conditions also enabled the regime to maintain a degree of popularity among
Kazakhstanis. Reporters found that, the president is assumed to act in the state’s best interest, and
citizens are unconcerned by charges of corruption, assuming that if the state possessed wealth, then
“the head of state must be rich, too.” Citizens also claimed that alternatives to Nazarbayev were more
likely to be corrupt and that conditions in neighboring states were noticeably worse.321 Such claims may
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indicate that the regime’s use of non-repressive tactics created a degree of tolerance among citizens.
Likewise, the regime’s ability to spend revenues on development projects may have also generated
popularity among Kazakhstanis. This context would seem to suggest that the regime successfully
placated citizens, potentially reducing public critique of the regime’s performance.
Effects of resource dependency on long-term growth
Such conditions exist because oil revenues led to rapid economic growth. Yet this type of growth
is not sustainable. Pomfret observed that development spurred by natural resources tended to have
negative ramifications on long-term economic growth. He suggested that resource-generated growth
was vulnerable to Dutch disease, price swings on global markets, and “rent seeking and distortion of
institutions.” Pomfret did not consider Dutch disease to be a major threat to the national economy as of
2005; nevertheless, he suggested the corresponding increase in currency value may prohibit growth in
non-resource sectors that could have developed otherwise.322 For instance, US Company, Philip Morris’
investment in a Kazakhstani tobacco company was the only significant investment that was not intended
to develop the state’s natural resources.323 Such investment patterns indicate that investors are
primarily interested in the state’s natural resources. When these resources are depleted, there is no
guarantee that the state will be able to maintain economic growth.
Likewise, oil traded on the international market is appraised by a plethora of concerns, any of
which may impact prices. Such fluctuations can have a significant impact on domestic policy. Price
changes may enrich a state, yet rapid devaluation would also damage that state’s economy. Given these
conditions, itis significant that Kazakhstan’s national economy began to improve following a price uptick
in 2000 and expanded further in 2007 and 2008 following another increase in the cost of
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oil.324Kazakhstan benefitted from a rising cost of oil, yet such resource dependency can be precarious.
Pomfret claimed reliance on revenues generated by high prices can negatively impact a state if it is not
prepared to properly invest such gains.325 The volatility of such revenues can pose serious problems for
states that are resource dependent. Kazakhstan’s reliance on such revenues could lead to a crippling
downturn if oil markets collapsed.
Rent-seeking among elites also poses serious problems to the state, and has the potential to
impact economic growth. Scholars have identified several rentier mechanisms which influenced
development factors. They expressed concern that rent-seeking would cause a state to delay
diversification of the national economy and were also concerned that the level of revenue generated by
natural resources would allow a state to maintain a false impression of economic viability.326
Dependency on a single resource would lead to an economic crisis if the oil market were to collapse. In
this context, it is significant that other economic sectors in Kazakhstan had not performed as well as the
oil industry and, in spite of government efforts to encourage investment; non-oil sectors only attracted a
small amount of investment in 2005.327 Such conditions demonstrate that Kazakhstan is heavily reliant
on its oil industry. A negative shock to this sector would have serious consequences for the Kazakhstani
economy.
Effects of resource dependency on political development
Scholars also expressed concern was that wealth generated through investment would
contribute to “illegal rent-seeking behavior.” More specifically, scholars worried that the state’s ability
to attract rents would reduce the need for taxation, isolating leaders from the population and enabling
them to pursue “individualistic, rent-seeking” policies.328 Bayulgen made similar observations about
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politics in potential rentier states. She noted that leaders of states which used resources to attract rents
were more likely to develop methods of autocratic governing, as rents also helped the state draw
revenue from an active oil industry.329 Given these concerns, it is significant that agreements between
the regime and foreign oil corporations were largely conducted by the president, whose unilateral
decisions were considered legally valid. This was considered to be a defining feature of rentier states.330
These conditions indicate that Kazakhstan developed features of a rentier state. Such conditions were
likely to enhance the regime’s ability to control political life in Kazakhstan. Restricting the regime’s
ability to collect rents will be a crucial step towards establishing a representative government.
Pomfret also observed instances of corruption, in which investing corporations made discrete
payments to members of the regime. For example, an executive for Mobil was imprisoned in 2003
because of “tax evasion” for payments he received from the sale of his stake in the Tengiz oil field.331
Others have defined this as a primary form rentierism, in which state revenue is specifically generated
by resources. They observed that such states had a greater chance of becoming autocracies, as only a
minority of citizens was involved in collection and dispersal of rents. Scholars also expressed concern
that the ability to attract such rents contributed to corruption, as it encouraged the misuse of rents for
private profit.332 Such conditions have allowed the Nazarbayev regime to profit from oil industry
development. This empowered the regime and enabled President Nazarbayev to consolidate power and
prevent political development.
Conclusion
To conclude, Kazakhstan was able to achieve an astounding level of development after gaining
independence. The state’s oil resources helped the state attract investors, and it was the development
of Kazakhstan’s natural resources that propelled economic growth. However, the effects of this
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development have had a profound impact on the state. Kazakhstan’s dependency on oil has the
potential to undermine the state’s economic success. For instance, the effects of Dutch disease may also
decrease the productivity of non-oil sectors, which may also require substantial state assistance to
encourage growth.333 Thus, despite the growth that the oil industry created, over-reliance on these
resources may ultimately damage the Kazakhstani economy.
There were also political ramifications to this development. The state’s ability to attract
investment empowered elites to pursue rents and created a culture of corruption.334 As a result,
President Nazarbayev and his regime, which had already passed autocratic measures, were able to
consolidate their hold over political life and effectively stifle political development. Foreign investment
and oil revenues also contributed to these developments. According to Bayulgen, this investment
enriched state leaders and provided them with legitimacy they might not have otherwise attained.335
Kazakhstan developed features of a rentier state and its political leaders succeeded in undercutting
opposition and further ensconcing itself in a position of power.336 Such conditions are likely to persist
until Kazakhstan’s resource-driven growth is threatened. This may finally lead Kazakhstanis to demand
political reforms from their traditionally non-responsive government.
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Franke, et. al., 125; the authors applied this description to all “post-Soviet rentier states.”
335
Bayulgen, “Foreign Capital in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” 50, 52.
336
Franke, et. al., 125; the authors describe the ability of the president’s family to influence
business and political development.
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